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“Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts.”
Richard Feynman
“Shall I refuse my dinner because I do not fully understand the process of digestion?”
Oliver Heaviside
vAbstract
TheLatent Structure of the Dark Triad: UnifyingMachiavellianism and
Psychopathy
The Dark Triad (DT) has emerged as a popular extension to the extant literature on
personality psychology. The DT is comprised of three similar and yet distinct con-
structs: Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy. Recent research has criti-
cized the DT for suffering from a number of measurement problems, including a fail-
ure of existing Machiavellianism measures to adequately capture the construct. Prior
research has chiefly been conducted using domain level information, thus neglecting
item level information. The present thesis investigates the possibility of empirically
distinguishing between DT constructs with particular focus onMachiavellianism and
psychopathy, using item level information. In Article I, the Dirty Dozen inventory
is analyzed using latent variable models in order to replicate its structural proper-
ties. Results indicate that narcissism is more independent from Machiavellianism
and psychopathy than the latter two are with each other. These results provide initial
evidence that Machiavellianism and psychopathy are empirically indistinguishable.
In Article II, the Short Dark Triad (SD3) is analyzed in a series of factor analytic
models testing whether Machiavellianism and psychopathy can be jointly modeled.
The models fit similarly across two and three factor solutions, thus favoring a two
factor model based on the principle of parsimony. In Article III, the SD3 is mod-
eled using Item ResponseTheory in order to analyze howmuch information the SD3
provides across the latent trait continuum. Results indicate that SD3 items from the
domain of Machiavellianism may be less severe in content than psychopathy items,
thus yielding differential item endorsement rates, albeit along a unitary dimension.
In Article IV, the overarching literature on Machiavellianism is extended by analyz-
ing Machiavellianism items from 7 different measures using an hierarchical analysis.
This analysis is subsequently compared with expert rated Five Factor model prototype
scores o<f the DT constructs, in order to uncover the relative similarity between the
Machiavellianism structure and prototype descriptions of the DT constructs. These
analyses demonstrate that measures of Machiavellianism have a higher relative sim-
ilarity to prototypical psychopathy and narcissism, than prototypical Machiavellian-
ism. Taken together, these studies suggest that theoretical descriptions of Machi-
avellianism do not match empirical results, and further that Machiavellianism can be
modeled jointly with psychopathy along a single dimension. Thus, the Machiavel-
lianism research literature, which spans from the 1970s, is better conceptualized as
psychopathy. The proper place of the DT in the overarching personality psychology
literature is discussed.
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1Chapter 1: Introduction
The Dark Triad (DT) is a constellation of three psychological constructs, namely
Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). To-
gether, these three constructs reflect individual differences in manipulative and strate-
gic thinking (i.e., Machiavellianism), entitlement and feelings of superiority (i.e., nar-
cissism), and finally callousness and lack of empathy (i.e., psychopathy). These three
constructs are referred to as ”dark” because of their common themes of question-
able morality, potential for aggression, and otherwise interpersonally dysfunctional
characteristics. Such dark phenomena have traditionally been studied by clinical psy-
chologists and psychiatrists. Indeed, psychopathy and narcissism (but not Machi-
avellianism) are classified as Personality Disorders (PDs) in psychiatric classification
systems (e.g., American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013), and have extensive
research traditions in the clinical domain. Tradition notwithstanding, in recent years
there has been significant integration of clinical psychology, psychiatry, and person-
ality psychology. This integration consists of the realization that normal and abnor-
mal personality can be conceptualized along dimensions (as opposed to categories, or
types) within the unified framework of the Five Factor model (FFM), which consists
of the five broad bi-polar domains: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness,
neuroticism, and openness to experience (Costa & McCrae, 1992d).
The DT constructs show considerable overlap, but the main focus of this thesis is
their dissimilarities. More specifically, recent research on Machiavellianism and psy-
chopathy suggests that these putatively different constructs are better represented as
a unitary phenomenon (e.g., Glenn & Sellbom, 2015; Miller, Vize, Crowe, & Ly-
nam, 2019). The validity of this claim and the utility of a unified model are the main
concerns presently. While the distinction between Machiavellianism and psychopa-
thy is the focal point of this thesis, narcissism is nevertheless an important point of
discussion in order to contextualize effect sizes across the literature and as a point of
comparison for Machiavellianism and psychopathy.
The importance of construct discreteness is substantial. Machiavellianism has
been studied since the late 1960s (Christie &Geis, 1970) and continues to be utilized
in many applied research areas, including work and organizational psychology (e.g.,
Belschak, Hartog, & Hoogh, 2018; Palmer, Komarraju, Carter, & Karau, 2017).
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
While such research is not problematic in itself, the failure to recognize the substan-
tial overlap between Machiavellianism and psychopathy has led to parallel research
literatures, which I argue, introduces unnecessary and confusing additions to a re-
search literature that should preferably be merged. This argument is not new. In fact,
it was introduced by McHoskey, Worzel, and Szyarto (1998), more than 20 years
ago. Neither is this problem unique to Machiavellianism and psychopathy. Indeed,
Kelley (1927) introduced the jingle-jangle fallacy to illustrate a common problem in
the conceptualization of psychological constructs. Jingle refers to two constructs with
equivalent labels that really reflect different phenomena, whereas jangle refers to when
one construct is given multiple names. Machiavellianism and psychopathy, I argue,
suffers from the latter, the jangle fallacy (cf. Block, 1995).
The DT has emerged as a very popular construct – the seminal introduction of
the DT has been cited more than 2,500 times according to Google Scholar (Paul-
hus & Williams, 2002) – but its construct validity is nevertheless questionable. One
issue pertains to the use of short inventories for assessment of the DT, such as the
Dirty Dozen (DD; Jonason & Webster, 2010) and Short Dark Triad (SD3; Jones
& Paulhus, 2014). These inventories were introduced because of the lengthiness of
the extant measures used early DT research, which required at least 91 items (Jona-
son &Webster, 2010). Thus, when studying the DT in unison with other constructs,
the total number of items could easily exceed 100, which in some research contexts
can be inefficient. Accordingly, shorter inventories were introduced as remedies, but
short measures have both benefits and drawbacks. One particularly pressing issue in
this case is the neglect of multidimensionality, or heterogeneity, within each DT con-
struct (Miller et al., 2019). All three DT constructs reflect complex phenomena that
are at risk of being oversimplified when measures are shortened. Importantly, there
are substantial measurement issues inherent in the longer measures, as well. As this
dissertation focuses on the construct validity of the DT, measurement plays a promi-
nent role throughout. The importance of reliable measurement is that it serves as the
foundation for the validity of subsequent findings (Borsboom, 2006; Flake & Fried,
in press).
The structure of this dissertation is as follows: Before describing the particular
research studies conducted by me and my colleagues, a description of the recent in-
tegration of personality psychology and psychiatry is necessary. This integration is
currently underway and as a consequence, the FFM and Personality Disorder (PD)
literatures are merging together. This integration is described in more detail in Chap-
ter 2. The DT is reviewed in more detail in Chapter 3 and its focus is particularly
on construct validity and assessment related issues. Being that this thesis takes the
distinction (or lack thereof ) between Machiavellianism and psychopathy as its focal
point, it is also necessary to describe and discuss statistical methods relevant for un-
derstanding how psychological constructs are delineated, in particular how the process
Chapter 1. Introduction 3
of construct validation (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Tay & Jebb, 2018) is conducted
in personality research. This discussion takes place in Chapter 4. Having presented
these necessary foundations, the empirical studies are described in greater detail in
Chapter 5 and discussed in Chapter 6. The studies are also briefly described below.
The primary aim in the present studies is to better understand the empirical over-
lap between Machiavellianism and psychopathy. A secondary aim is to further inves-
tigate the utility of the FFM in explaining all three DT constructs. An auxiliary aim is
to provide an explanation as to why Machiavellianism and psychopathy produce dif-
ferential criterion correlations, given their high overlap. Additionally, an overarching
goal is to illustrate how personality trait configurations (i.e., personality trait pro-
files) are different from personality types, which have been the dominant perspective
in PD research historically. This gradual change from categorical (i.e., types) to di-
mensional (i.e., configurations) models has been characterized as a paradigm shift for
personality and psychopathology research (John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008; cf. Kotov,
Krueger, &Watson, 2018). This change entails the possibility of anchoring disparate
personality constructs, such as the DT, in a unified framework, which in turn makes
the present research more relevant for the overarching literature on personality and
individual differences.
Article I investigates the factor structure of a popular and often-used DT inven-
tory, the DD (Jonason & Webster, 2010). Its factor structure was replicated in a
relatively large sample (N = 3,698). Additionally, this inventory was subjected to
analyses aimed at better understanding both the commonality across the DT con-
structs as well as item-specific characteristics. This study was one of the first to sug-
gests that Machiavellianism and psychopathy could be unified and furthermore that
interpersonal exploitation seemed to be a common theme in the DT constructs.
Article II consists of three different studies aimed at replicating and extending
previous results on the SD3 (Jones & Paulhus, 2014) inventory. Using a priori spec-
ified factor models in which Machiavellianism and psychopathy are both modelled
jointly and separately, we demonstrate that these putatively different domains can be
represented as a single construct. We suggest that a combined (i.e., Machiavellian-
ism + psychopathy) model is preferable based on the principle of parsimony. These
findings also have theoretical consequences pertaining to the measurement ofMachi-
avellianism, being that concurrent evidence also suggests that measures ofMachiavel-
lianism are more similar in their empirical profiles to psychopathy, thus suggesting
that measures ofMachiavellianismmore closely correspond to what one would expect
from psychopathy.
Article III investigates item properties of the SD3 using other analytic techniques
than those used previously. Our results again indicate that Machiavellianism and
psychopathy indeed are preferable to model together than apart, although it seems
that items measuring Machiavellianism are phrased less harshly than psychopathy
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items. Thus, although these two domains can be modeled as one, item endorsement
rates will likely differ which plausibly affects external correlations. These findings are
also extended by illustrating the negative consequences of including narcissism in a
combined model (i.e., one model with all three DT constructs). This further suggests
that narcissism is more different toMachiavellianism and psychopathy than those two
constructs are to each other.
Article IV recognizes the limitations of previous studies (those presented herein
and those conducted by others) and thus extends the literature by collecting data on a
large set of Machiavellianism items. These items are organized in hierarchical factors
and subsequently compared against expert rated profiles of Machiavellianism, narcis-
sism, and psychopathy. The results show that items putatively measuring Machiavel-
lianism are more similar to both psychopathy and narcissism, as rated by experts, than
to prototype Machiavellianism. This study shows that inventories purported to mea-
sure Machiavellianism more accurately reflect prototypical ratings of psychopathy. It
further illustrates the utility of the FFM in describing a wide range of phenomena,
including the DT constructs. The importance and relevance of these studies are sub-
sequently discussed in Chapter 6 where they are contextualized within the broader
FFM framework.
5Chapter 2: Normal and Abnormal Personality
In the past decade, a lot has happened in terms of integrating psychiatric classi-
fication and personality assessment. Development in this area has been particularly
driven by the most recent revision of the predominant psychiatric classification sys-
tem, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). In order to
place this development in its proper place, this chapter takes the DSM-III (APA,
1980) as its starting point. This description includes the particulars of how normal
(i.e., adaptive, functional) and abnormal (i.e., maladaptive, dysfunctional)1 person-
ality have ultimately become integrated in a unified model (Hopwood, 2018). This
unification has its roots in the increasing concerns (see Cuthbert & Insel, 2010; Insel
et al., 2010; Livesley, 2010) about the fifth edition of theDSM (DSM-5;APA, 2013),
produced and published by the APA.2 This chapter begins by describing the DSM ,
including a few examples of substantial problems inherent in the DSM paradigm.
Particular focus is placed on PDs and their relation to the FFM.
2.1 TheDSM Paradigm
For a long time, mental disorders – including PDs – have been thought of as natural
categories, or what is sometimes referred to as taxa (Meehl, 1992). Taxa refer to dis-
crete differences between conditions, such that one is either schizophrenic or not. A
dimensional model, on the other hand, posits that an individual may be schizophrenic
to some degree. Evidence suggests that most DSM disorders are dimensional in na-
ture (Haslam, Holland, & Kuppens, 2012; Widiger & Samuel, 2005; Wright et al.,
2013; see also Borsboom et al., 2016). The prevailing paradigm for psychiatric clas-
sification was established in the DSM-III (APA, 1980). DSM-III introduced two
major features not present in previous classification systems: diagnostic criteria for
Parts of this chapter have been adapted from Persson (2019a).
1 The word ”maladaptive” in this context does not refer to evolutionary function, but rather what
DeYoung and Krueger (2018) refer to as ”cybernetic function” (or dysfunction). That is, it refers to
the extent to which an individual succeeds or fails to make progress toward important life goals.
2 For a more detailed review of the development of the differentDSM editions, see Blashfield, Keeley,
Flanagan, and Miles (2014).
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each mental disorder category and a multiaxial system (Blashfield et al., 2014). Edi-
tions prior to DSM-III did not use explicit diagnostic criteria but instead relied only
on prose definitions for each mental disorder, which led to poor inter-rater reliability
(Blashfield et al., 2014). The multiaxial system was meant to be useful for provid-
ing comprehensive diagnosis, as each patient was expected to be diagnosed on five
separate axes (see Blashfield et al., 2014). The five axes were meant to describe: (I)
the presence of mental disorder categories (e.g., schizophrenia); (II) personality dys-
function and intellectual disability; (III) medical disorders relevant to the patient’s
psychiatric presentation; (IV) stressors in the social environment; and (V) an assess-
ment of overall adaptive functioning.
The DSM-III approach is often referred to as neo-Kraepelinian (Blashfield,
1984), as it shared the philosophy of Emil Kraepelin (1856–1926), in that it moved
away from psychoanalysis and towardmethods from traditional medicine. TheDSM-
III, like Kraepelin, emphasized signs (observable manifestations), symptoms (sub-
jective reports), and natural history (trajectory over time), instead of psychoanalytic
concepts, which were more influential in DSM-I and DSM-II (see Blashfield et al.,
2014; Lilienfeld, Smith, & Watts, 2013; Lilienfeld & Treadway, 2016).
The DSM-IV (APA, 1994) grew in size,3 but not much changed in the approach
or underlying philosophy. One of the things that changed was a gradual move to-
wards polythetic diagnostic criteria, which as opposed to monothetic criteria, means
that signs and symptoms are neither necessary nor sufficient for diagnosis (Lilienfeld
et al., 2013). Monothetic criteria are useful as they maximize homogeneity within
PD categories, as all individuals in a diagnostic category share traits. Conversely, the
polythetic approach leads to diagnostic heterogeneity. For instance, borderline PD
includes 256 different criteria combinations, all yielding the same disorder. Remark-
ably, for some diagnoses in the DSM-IV, it is possible for two patients to have no
overlap in diagnostic criteria (Lilienfeld et al., 2013). For a clinician to be expected
(perhaps required) to provide the same treatment, for individuals who share no diag-
nostic criteria, clearly points to an inherent problem in theDSM-IV model. Accord-
ingly, polythetic criteria have been criticized for creating overly heterogeneous patient
groups (Krueger, 2013), while monothetic criteria suffer from the opposite problem,
creating overly narrow groups, thus not allowing for conditional indicators that may
not be present in all cases (Widiger & Frances, 1985). The issues surrounding both
monothetic and polythetic criteria are well established (see e.g., Cooper, Balsis, &
Zimmerman, 2010; Pfohl, Coryell, Zimmerman, & Stangl, 1986).
The DSM-IV model contains 10 PDs: Paranoid, Schizoid, Schizotypal, An-
tisocial, Borderline, Histrionic, Narcissistic, Avoidant, Dependent, and Obsessive-
compulsive. There is also an 11th category: PD not otherwise specified (PD–NOS)
3 Interestingly, while the DSM grew in size generally, the PD section decreased in size.
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which was meant to be used when none of the other PDs fit a patient’s symptoms.
Because patients often do not fit neatly into PD categories, patients are either given
multiple diagnoses (which is known as the problem of comorbidity, see Cramer, Wal-
dorp, van derMaas, &Borsboom, 2010) or placed in the PD–NOS category (Verheul
& Widiger, 2004). Both approaches cause substantial problems in clinical decision
making: PD–NOS is unspecific and comorbidity dictates that an individual may ful-
fill criteria for three different diagnoses, thus raising questions about which diagnosis
to treat, and how.
2.1.1 DSM-5: Empirical Evidence, Opposition to Innovation, and
Steps Forward
Onemajor effort undertaken in theDSM–5 (APA, 2013) was the attempt at replacing
the previous (i.e.,DSM–IV–TR, text rev.; APA, 2000) categorical model of PDwith a
dimensional model. This development was predicated on accumulating evidence that
PDs are better conceptualized (and modeled statistically) as continuous and not as
discrete phenomena (e.g., Markon, Chmielewski, & Miller, 2011; Trull & Durrett,
2005). These findings ran in parallel with the insight that taxonomies of normal
personality could help shape models of pathological personality (see e.g., Widiger &
Mullins-Sweatt, 2009; Widiger & Trull, 2007).
The effort to replace the categorical model fell short and the DSM–IV–TR per-
sonality disorder section was copied verbatim into the DSM–5. The dimensional
model was ultimately placed in a section called ”Emerging Measures and Models”
(APA, 2013, p. 729). Plenty has been written about issues within the DSM–5 task
force (Frances, 2009; Spitzer, 2009), the inner workings of the Personality Disor-
der Work Group (e.g., Gunderson, 2013; Skodol, Morey, Bender, & Oldham, 2013;
Zachar, Krueger, & Kendler, 2016), including the resignation of two of Work Group
members (e.g., Livesley, 2012; Verheul, 2012), and finally reflections about the af-
termath and efforts to improve future revisions of psychiatric classification systems
(e.g., Lilienfeld, 2014; Widiger & Crego, 2015). The purpose here is merely to ex-
pand on how the DSM has become increasingly entangled with personality psychol-
ogy, a process which is likely to go even further in both future DSM editions and in
psychopathology research more generally.
2.2 Dimensions of Normal and Abnormal Personality
During the DSM–5 revision process, one concern was that much of the literature re-
viewed in support of a dimensional model contained studies of normal and not clinical
populations. Much of this evidence, undoubtedly, relied on the FFM (Costa, Mc-
Crae, & Löckenhoff, 2019; Costa & McCrae, 2017; McCrae & John, 1992), which
8 Chapter 2. Normal and Abnormal Personality
is comprised of five broad bipolar personality domains: extraversion, agreeableness,
openness to experience, neuroticism, and conscientiousness. Bipolarity refers to that
all five domains denote opposing behavioral tendencies on the different sides of the
spectrum (e.g., fearfulness vs. fearlessness are descriptors of opposite ends of trait
anxiety). There is good theoretical and empirical evidence supporting that this bipo-
larity is also reflected in maladaptivity at both poles, meaning that both e.g. extremely
low and high trait agreeableness can be maladaptive (Widiger & Crego, 2019). This
concept is further exemplified in Table 2.1.
Together, these domains are both impressive descriptive taxonomies of personality
phenotypes, as well as reliable predictors of a great variety of consequential outcomes
(Grucza & Goldberg, 2007; Ozer & Benet-Martinez, 2006; Soto, 2019). The FFM
allows for individual profile scores, meaning that an individual is assessed on each of
the five dimensions. This procedure creates a more refined picture of an individual’s
personality than placement in a discrete category. In other words, knowing that one
belongs to the 87th percentile in extraversion is more informative than being placed
in a category of ”extraverts” (i.e., a category into which everyone with extraversion
scores above the mean is placed).
In commonly used personality inventories, the five domains are further divisible
into facets. These facets represent personality at a more detailed level of analysis. In
recent years, describing personality at different levels of abstraction has become in-
creasingly common, with analyses of nuances (which refers to individual questionnaire
items; Mõttus, Kandler, Bleidorn, Riemann, & McCrae, 2017), aspects (DeYoung,
Quilty, & Peterson, 2007), and higher-order factors, or so-called metatraits, such as
alpha-beta (Digman, 1997), stability-plasticity (DeYoung, 2006), and the general
factor of personality (Musek, 2007; Rushton & Irwing, 2008).
During the creation process of theDSM–5, the Personality DisorderWorkGroup
ultimately proposed a model inspired by the FFM, which included five broad mal-
adaptive domains (with adaptive FFM equivalents in parentheses) negative affectivity
(neuroticism), detachment (introversion), antagonism ((dis)agreeableness), disinhibi-
tion (low conscientiousness), and psychoticism (openness to experience). In addition
to these five broad domains, the model consists of 25 facets in total. During the
process of validating this model, an instrument called the Personality Inventory for
DSM–5 was created (PID-5; Krueger, Derringer, Markon, Watson, & Skodol, 2012;
Suzuki, Samuel, Pahlen, & Krueger, 2015), which in recent years has been proven to
be psychometrically sound (Hopwood, Thomas, Markon, Wright, & Krueger, 2012;
Morey, Krueger, & Skodol, 2013; Thomas et al., 2013), and more clinically use-
ful than the DSM–IV model (Morey, Skodol, & Oldham, 2014). It should also
be noted that substantial effort has been put into integrating normal and abnormal
personality models, both historically (e.g., Cloninger, 1987; Cloninger, Svrakic, &
Przybeck, 1993; Eysenck, 1947), and more recently (Markon, Krueger, & Watson,
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2005; Widiger & Simonsen, 2005), which has ultimately yielded FFM based mod-
els that describe both normal and abnormal personality functioning across multiple
levels of abstraction (Caspi et al., 2014; Hengartner, Ajdacic-Gross, Wyss, Angst, &
Rössler, 2016a; Kendler et al., 2017; Krueger & Markon, 2014; Mõttus et al., 2017;
Rosenström et al., 2018).
Establishing a joint conceptualization of general psychopathology, normal and
abnormal personality, and the DT is no easy task, but approximate relations between
these domains are presented in Figure 2.1. As the figure suggests, psychopathology
is a broad domain of general mental illness. PDs are a subset of psychopathology that
can be explained, at least in part, by the FFM. The DT is a partial subset of PDs,
because Machiavellianism is not technically a PD. Further, the DT can be explained
by the FFM, but the opposite relation does not hold, as the FFM describes far more
than the DT. Although not fully recognized in psychiatric nosology, personality trait
models are also able to account for some of the variance in psychopathology that
are not formally defined as PDs (i.e., Axis I disorders in the DSM system), such
as substance abuse disorders, phobias, and major depression (e.g., Kotov, Gamez,
Schmidt, & Watson, 2010). This diagram is meant to be a rough approximation of
the overlap between these domains, mainly for illustrative purposes. Depending on
exact definitions of each conceptual domain, the overlap between domains are bound
to change to some extent.
2.3 The Lexical Hypothesis
Sir Francis Galton was the originator of the ”lexical hypothesis”, which states that in-
dividual differences in personality are encoded in natural language (Goldberg, 1993).
While Galton (1884) may have been first, Allport and Odbert (1936) made the most
notable headway in the empirical study of the lexical hypothesis. Initially, they ex-
tracted a total of 17,953 terms (roughly 4.5% of the total English vocabulary) from
an unabridged English dictionary. Each term was meant to describe some form of
human behavior. This list was subsequently reduced, by both Allport and Odbert
(1936), themselves, and by others (e.g., Cattell, 1943; Goldberg, 1982; but for a
more detailed description, see John, Angleitner, & Ostendorf, 1988).
One pioneer of individual differences research was L. L. Thurstone, who early on
analyzed 60 trait adjectives and found that five factors were ”...sufficient to account
for the coefficients” (Thurstone, 1934, p. 13). Thurstone also managed to capture
the essence of what would become the main approach to studying personality in the
future.
It is of considerable psychological interest to know that the whole list of
sixty adjectives can be accounted for by postulating only five independent
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Figure 2.1. The relations between psychopathology, personality
disorders, the Dark Triad, and the Five Factor model.
common factors. It was of course to be expected that all of the sixty
adjectives would not be independent, but we did not foresee that the list
could be accounted for by as few as five factors. This fact leads us to
surmise that the scientific description of personality may not be quite so
hopelessly complex as it is sometimes thought to be (Thurstone, 1934,
pp. 13–14).
This psychometric line of research generated a plethora of theories and models.
Among the more well-known are Cattell’s 16PF (Cattell, Eber, & Tatsuoka, 1970;
Cattell &Krug, 1986), andEysenck’s BigThree (Eysenck, Eysenck, &Barrett, 1985).
However, out of all of themodels, only five factors have replicated across a wide variety
of data sets (for reviews, see Costa & McCrae, 1992a; Digman, 1990; Goldberg,
1993; although note that there are contrarian views; Block, 1995; Eysenck, 1992).
2.4 Personality Traits
The existence of personality traits have been subject to much dispute, so much so, that
Lewis Goldberg (1993, p. 26) opened his most cited paper satirizing the issue: ”Once
upon a time, we had no personalities (Mischel, 1968).” Here, Goldberg refers to a
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seminal book by Walter Mischel (1968), which more or less singlehandedly caused a
hiatus in personality research. Mischel (1968, p. 146) argued that ”[w]ith the possible
exception of intelligence, highly generalized behavioral consistencies have not been
demonstrated, and the concept of personality traits as broad dispositions is thus un-
tenable”. With this in mind, two things need clarification: one of which is empirical,
and the other theoretical. Regarding the former, Mischel (1968) argued that because
the correlation between personality and various outcomes is seldom above .30, per-
sonality can be disregarded. It is easy to dispute this conclusion, as a correlation of
.30 is a substantial effect in social sciences (Gignac & Szodorai, 2016; Meyer et al.,
2001). Regarding the latter, theoretical issue, a lot has been said about the so-called
person vs. situation debate, which refers to whether situations or personality are most
important for determining behavior (e.g., Fleeson, 2004; and references therein, but
see also Hogan, 2009). Rorer and Widiger (1983, p. 445) framed the issue nicely:
In one sense this widespread acceptance [of a situationist viewpoint]
seems strange, because we have never met anyone who, from a behav-
ioral viewpoint, was not a trait theorist. If one really believes that sit-
uations determine behavior, then there is no reason to test or interview
prospective employees for jobs such as police officer, it is only necessary
to structure the job situation properly. Picking a mate would simply be a
matter of finding someone whose physical characteristics appeal to you.
In a properly managed class all students would work up to their abilities.
Do you know anyone who believes these things? Obviously not. Why,
then, have so many intelligent people come to espouse a theoretical point
of view that none of them practices?
Accordingly, while the behavior of an individual certainly differs across situations,
from the perspective of contemporary personality psychology, people also follow rou-
tines over time, and are thus, to some extent, predictable. More than that, people have
relatively stable dispositions (i.e., traits) that are influential in a wide variety of life out-
comes (Ozer &Benet-Martinez, 2006; Soto, 2019), including academic achievement
(Poropat, 2009), relationship satisfaction (Malouff, Thorsteinsson, Schutte, Bhullar,
& Rooke, 2010), psychopathology (Kotov et al., 2010), and most relevant for this
dissertation, personality disorders (Samuel & Widiger, 2008).
With that said, the utility of the FFM does not elucidate what a trait actually is
and the trait concept is, indeed, contentious. Personality psychologists have long pro-
moted traits as substantively important concepts for explaining a person’s behavior.
For example, more than 50 years ago, Allport wrote that ”Scarcely anyone questions
the existence of traits as the fundamental units of personality. Common speech pre-
supposes them. This man, we say, is gruff and shy, but a hard worker; that woman is
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fastidious, talkative, and stingy” (Allport, 1961, p. 332). While scarcely any person-
ality psychologist question traits – at least the utility of trait based measures – traits
are nevertheless predicated on a number of assumptions (Wakefield, 1989). Further-
more, personality psychologists are not in complete agreement with regards to what
the term ”trait” refers to (Pervin, 1994). For instance, Wiggins (1973, as cited in
Pervin, 1994) argued that ”traits are ’lost causes’; their existence requires, rather than
provides, a scientific explanation” (p. 109). Moreover, the traditional definition of
traits, namely that they are ”relatively enduring patterns of thoughts, feelings and ac-
tions” (Costa & McCrae, 2008, p. 160) does not really answer what ”a pattern of
thoughts” refers to. The interested reader can consult Wakefield (1989) for a philo-
sophical perspective on traits, or a special issue of the Journal of Research in Personality
for more detailed elaborations on different trait theories (Fajkowska & DeYoung,
2015).
An additional fact, related to the discussion above, requires brief attention. Per-
sonality psychology has been largely (but far from entirely) reliant on self-reports, and
a lot has been said about what self-reports actually represent. Few, if any, personal-
ity psychologists view self-reported behavior as completely veridical. Exactly what is
measured in a self-report personality inventory is difficult to say (although the theo-
ries alluded to above may provide some idea). One skeptical view is that of Hogan
and Foster (2016), who question what they call ”self-report theory”, which suppos-
edly posits that individuals play back their lives in their heads when asked a question
about themselves. They argue that this is factually incorrect, as such a theory fails to
acknowledge the importance of human memory. The human brain does not record
internal video tapes that represent reality, and so we cannot reliably assess how many
books a year we read (which a questionnaire may ask). Indeed, Hogan and Foster
(2016) posit that responses to self-report questionnaires is an engagement in repu-
tation control, and are thus not informative about what people are actually like, but
what they like to present to others. This view has been criticized by others, who
take different stances (DeYoung, 2017; Funder, 2017). Another take on this issue
was provided long ago by Paul Meehl (Meehl, 1945), who argued that the scoring of
personality tests is not dependent on the responses being true in an objective sense.
Meehl used several examples, but one illustration suffices:
Consider the MMPI [Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory; a
standardized test still in use today] scale for detecting tendencies to
hypochondriasis. A hypochondriac says that he has headaches often,
that he is not in as good health as his friends are, and that he cannot
understand what he reads as well as he used to. Suppose that he has a
headache on an average of once every month, as does a certain ”normal”
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person. The hypochondriac says he often has headaches, the other per-
son says he does not. They both have headaches once a month, and hence
they must either interpret the word ”often” differently in that question, or
else have unequal recall of their headaches. According to the traditional
view, this ambiguity in the word ”often” and the inaccuracy of human
memory constitute sources of error, for the authors of MMPI they may
actually constitute sources of discrimination (Meehl, 1945, p. 298).
Accordingly, the MMPI could be used to test for the presence of hypochondriasis;
whether the responses were veridical was not necessarily that important. The more
important concern is whether individuals believe what they are reporting. These issues
are continually discussed in the scientific literature, but there are no simple answers.
2.5 The Five FactorModel and HEXACO
The FFM (Costa &McCrae, 1992b, 2017; McCrae & John, 1992) or the ”Big Five”
(Goldberg, 1990)4 describe the five broad personality domains uncovered in the re-
search started by Gordon Allport. Figure 2.2 depicts an example conceptualization
of the personality trait hierarchy. Note that the facet names are taken from the Inter-
national Personality Item Pool Representation of the NEO PI-RTM (IPIP-NEO),
and the aspects and higher-order domains are adopted from DeYoung et al. (2007).
Nuances are omitted for ease of presentation. Additionally, a sixth factor, Honesty–
Humility, from the HEXACO model,5 is included using dashed lines, to indicate
its distinctness from the FFM. The HEXACO model is particularly relevant in this
thesis because HEXACO–Honesty-Humility (HH) has been shown to be a viable
alternative to the DT. Indeed, a recent study showed a latent variable correlation be-
tween HH and DT of .95, suggesting that the two are almost identical (Hodson et
al., 2018).
It should be noted that different personality models utilize different terminol-
ogy and also differ substantively to some extent. For instance, the HEXACO
model, in addition to adding a sixth factor, differs in the original five. HEXACO–
Agreeableness is meant to capture irritability and temperamentalness, which belongs
to emotional stability in the FFM. An incomplete list of trait terms and their or-
ganization in FFM language is presented in John et al. (2008, pp. 115, 120). In
4 Some scholars make a distinction between the FFM and the Big Five (John & Robins, 1993).
Goldberg (1993) articulates some of the differences, including that the fourth factor is ”emotional
stability” in the FFM and the opposite, i.e. ”neuroticism” in the Big Five. Such minutiae play a
very minor role in the studies presented in this thesis. Accordingly, the FFM and Big Five terms
are used interchangeably throughout.
5 HEXACO is an abbreviation of Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience
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six subsequent sections, each trait domain is explored in more detail. Please note,
however, that these descriptions are kept relatively short and are merely used as brief
descriptions about the contents of each domain. The interested reader is directed to-
wards other, more detailed, literature (Digman, 1990; McCrae & Costa, 1997, 2003;
McCrae, Terracciano, & 78 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project,
2005; Widiger, 2017; Widiger & Costa, 2013).
2.5.1 Agreeableness
John et al. (2008, p. 120) describes high agreeableness as a ”prosocial and communal
orientation toward others” and contrasts it with low agreeableness, referring to an
antagonistic and self-centered orientation. Others have pointed to agreeableness as
being fundamentally saturated by a motivation to maintain positive relations with
others (Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997). Similarly, the IPIP-NEO (Johnson, 2014)
personality trait description (see http://ipip.ori.org/) of agreeableness states that:
Agreeableness reflects individual differences in concern with coopera-
tion and social harmony. Agreeable individuals value getting along with
others. They are therefore considerate, friendly, generous, helpful, and
willing to compromise their interests with others’. Agreeable people also
have an optimistic view of human nature. They believe people are basi-
cally honest, decent, and trustworthy.
Disagreeable individuals place self-interest above getting along with oth-
ers. They are generally unconcerned with others’ well-being, and there-
fore are unlikely to extend themselves for other people. Sometimes
their skepticism about others’ motives causes them to be suspicious, un-
friendly, and uncooperative.
In the IPIP-NEO (Johnson, 2014), agreeableness consists of six facets: trust,
morality, altruism, cooperation, modesty, and sympathy (see also Figure 2.2). In
the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992b), the facets are called: trust, straightfor-
wardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, and tendermindedness. The correlation
between the IPIP-300 domain and the NEO-PI-R domain of Agreeableness is .83,
with facets ranging from .62 to .78. Previous research at the aspect level of analy-
sis has yielded the higher-order dimensions politeness and compassion, the former
perhaps highlighting the more social aspects of agreeableness whereas the latter may
suggest deeper emotional content.
In recent years, a multitude of studies has utilized various factor analytic tech-
niques in order to reduce large sets of items supposed to tap one domain (e.g., agree-
ableness). One such example analyzed a total of 131 items from five different per-
sonality inventories, each meant to assess agreeableness (Crowe, Lynam, & Miller,
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2017). A series of analyses yielded a five factor solution in which the bipolar fac-
tors were labeled compassion vs. callousness, morality vs. immorality, modesty vs.
arrogance, affability vs. combativeness, and trust vs. distrust.
2.5.2 Extraversion
Extraversion reflect individual differences in the tendencies to experience and exhibit
positive affect (Wilt & Revelle, 2017), which makes it highly relevant to the field of
positive psychology (Costa & McCrae, 1980). Extraversion further stands out with
regards to personality disorders insofar as it, together with trait neuroticism, forms
two separate but correlated trait dimensions indicative of positive and negative af-
fect (Rusting & Larsen, 1997). This dual-aspect of well-being has been documented
independently in the well-being literature (e.g., Keyes, 2007), albeit with other ter-
minology. Fundamentally, extraversion has been used to describe differences in the
inner life of individuals, with extraverted people being more externally oriented (i.e.,
more focused on the external world) and introverts being more focused on their own,
inner worlds (Wilt & Revelle, 2017). Prior work by scholars such as Allport, Cattell,
and Eysenck generated many questions regarding what each trait domain ought to
contain. Extraversion is no different (e.g., Eysenck, 1977; Guilford, 1975). I chose,
however, not to dwell on these historical details and instead describe the contempo-
rary model of extraversion’s lower-order structure. Costa and McCrae (1992b) posit
warmth, gregariousness, assertiveness, activity-level, excitement-seeking, and posi-
tive emotion as facets of extraversion (cf. Figure 2.2).
2.5.3 Neuroticism
Neuroticism is a broad domain reflecting individual differences in negative affect
(Tackett & Lahey, 2017). It has been defined as ”the tendency to experience frequent,
intense negative emotions associated with a sense of uncontrollability (the perception
of inadequate coping) in response to stress” (Barlow, Ellard, Sauer-Zavala, Bullis, &
Carl, 2014, p. 481). Although different models describe neuroticism using different
terminology (e.g., the HEXACO uses the domain name emotionality and Goldberg’s
Big Five uses the opposite pole emotional stability, as domain name), they uniformly
reflect characteristics such as volatility or aggression, anxiety, depression, nervousness,
or what may simply be summarized as emotionality vs. unemotionality. High levels
of neuroticism are thus associated with almost all kinds of psychopathology (Caspi
et al., 2014; Oltmanns, Smith, Oltmanns, & Widiger, 2018; Widiger, 2011a).
16
Chapter2.
N
ormalandAbnormalPersonality
Extraversion
Assertiveness
Conscient-
iousness
Agreeable-
nessNeuroticism Openness
Honesty-
Humility
Enthusiasm
Industriousness
Orderliness
Compassion
Politeness
Withdrawal
Volatility
Openness
Intellect
Modesty
Fairness
Sincerity
Greed Avoidance
Domains
Aspects
Facets
Friendliness
Gregariousness
Assertiveness
Activity-Level
Excitement-Seeking
Cheerfulness
Self-Efficacy
Orderliness
Dutifulness
Achievement-Striving
Self-Discipline
Cautiousness
Trust
Morality
Altruism
Cooperation
Modesty
Sympathy
Anxiety
Anger
Depression
Self-
Consciousness
Immoderation
Vulnerability
Imagination
Artistic Interests
Emotionality
Adventurousness
Intellect
Liberalism
Stability Plasticity Metatraits
Five Factor Model (IPIP-NEO) HEXACO
Figure 2.2. The FFM structure across different levels of abstraction. See the main text for a more detailed description.
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One developmental theory proposes that neuroticism consists of triple vulnera-
bilities: (a) general biological (heritable) vulnerability, (b) general psychological vul-
nerability, and (c) a more specific psychological vulnerability. Vulnerabilities (a) and
(b) are believed to mediate risk for (c), which purportedly explains differential devel-
opmental pathways for different mental disorders (e.g., panic disorder vs. obsessive-
compulsive disorder) (Barlow et al., 2014).
High trait neuroticism does not only reflect a predisposition to psychological dis-
tress but also relates to subjective and objective aspects of physical health (Tackett
& Lahey, 2017). For instance, neuroticism is positively associated with greater risk
for cardiovascular disease and stroke (Jokela, Pulkki-Råback, Elovainio, & Kivimäki,
2014b; Suls & Bunde, 2005), asthma (Huovinen, Kaprio, & Koskenvuo, 2001), di-
abetes (Jokela et al., 2014a), and irritable bowel syndrome (Spiller, 2007). Addition-
ally, neuroticism predicts longevity in the general population (Smith & MacKenzie,
2006). In a 25-year longitudinal study of Danish participants treated for cancer, those
high in neuroticism had a 130% greater death rate than those with low trait neuroti-
cism (Nakaya et al., 2006; cf. Lahey, 2009). Higher trait neuroticism is also associated
with lower pain threshold and pain tolerance, and a greater degree of pain catastro-
phizing (Banozic et al., 2018; Wade, Dougherty, Hart, Rafii, & Price, 1992). In fact,
the link between neuroticism and various health factors is so robust that arguments
have been made supporting the use of short personality inventories as screening tools
for physical health risk in entire populations (Hengartner, Kawohl, Haker, Rössler,
& Ajdacic-Gross, 2016b).
2.5.4 Conscientiousness
Conscientiousness consists of a family of traits reflecting one’s propensity to be hard
working, orderly, self-controlled, achievement-oriented, responsible, and cautious
(Jackson & Roberts, 2017). Conscientiousness predicts various important life out-
comes, including health (Bogg & Roberts, 2004; Shanahan, Hill, Roberts, Eccles, &
Friedman, 2014), work performance (Brown, Lent, Telander, & Tramayne, 2011),
marital stability (Roberts, Walton, & Bogg, 2005b), academic achievement (Poropat,
2009). Furthermore, lack of conscientiousness (i.e., high impulsivity) is highly rele-
vant for a variety of psychiatric disorders (Beauchaine, Zisner, & Sauder, 2017).
One aspect of conscientiousness is the famous marshmallow experiments aimed
at understanding delay of gratification in children (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez,
1989). The original studies were carried out between 1968 and 1974, but follow-up
studies have been conducted on the once young participants. For instance, Schlam,
Wilson, Shoda, Mischel, and Ayduk (2013) showed that body mass index was pre-
dicted by the delay of gratification task completed 30 years prior. For every minute
participants delayed gratification, there was a 0.2 point reduction in body mass index
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in adulthood. Other studies have detailed the relationship between personality (con-
scientiousness and neuroticism are most strongly related) and body mass index, both
with and without reference to delay of gratification (Brummett et al., 2006; Murphy,
Stojek, & MacKillop, 2014).
In Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1, facets and trait descriptions for high and low con-
scientiousness are presented. However, a number of studies have investigated the
lower-order structure of conscientiousness (Jackson et al., 2010; MacCann, Duck-
worth, & Roberts, 2009; Roberts, Bogg, Walton, Chernyshenko, & Stark, 2004;
Roberts, Chernyshenko, Stark, &Goldberg, 2005a). Throughout these studies, there
are certain commonalities, such as the extraction of the factors industriousness and
orderliness (cf. MacCann et al., 2009). Studies aimed at uncovering the hierarchi-
cal structure found a distinction between inhibitive and proactive aspects of consci-
entiousness (Jackson et al., 2010; Roberts et al., 2005a). Inhibitive aspects refer to
components such as responsibility, impulse control and respect for tradition, whereas
proactive features refer to orderliness, organization, cleanliness, and punctuality. Ul-
timately, the number of facets one is interested in extracting depends on the specific
research question one is asking, but these studies illustrate approximately what con-
tent can be derived from the overarching domain of conscientiousness.
2.5.5 Openness to Experience
The domain openness to experience has been the most controversial factor (De Raad
& Van Heck, 1994). It was originally described as ”Culture” (Tupes & Christal,
1961/1992), and it is increasingly referred to as openness/intellect (DeYoung, Quilty,
Peterson, & Gray, 2014). Fundamentally, openness to experience reflects behav-
ioral variations in creativity, interest in aesthetics, ideas, values, and culture, depth
of feeling, and flexibility in action (cf. Figure 2.2). Traditionally, agreeableness and
extraversion have been labeled as the domains reflecting interpersonal phenomena
(Wiggins, 1979). However, McCrae argued that while ”openness is usually por-
trayed as an intrapsychic dimension” (McCrae, 1996, p. 323) there are macrosocial
influences on culture, social attitude and political affiliation that are caused by trait
openness. For instance, political orientation is chiefly influenced by openness, with
high trait openness being associated with progressive views, and low trait openness
with conservative views (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008). On that note, there
is evidence that authoritarianism is closely associated with low trait openness (r = -.57;
Trapnell, 1994). Similarly, when holding levels of agreeableness constant, low trait
openness individuals are more suspicious of out-group members than high trait open-
ness individuals (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Accordingly, while one’s level of openness
may not be as obviously associated with interpersonal behavior, it is nevertheless easy
to understand how openness relates to concrete social consequences. Consider family
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life, where parents with low openness will run families more rigidly, maintain more
traditional sex roles, value traditions, whereas high openness parents will be more
liberal, less rigid, less interested in tradition and traditional values (McCrae, 1996).
While extremely low levels of openness reflect alexithymic cognition (i.e., diffi-
culty identifying feelings, difficulty describing feelings, and externally oriented think-
ing), dogmatism and rigidity, extremely high levels have more self-evident psy-
chopathological consequences. In fact, there are a great number of studies on the topic
of psychoticism (see Harkness & McNulty, 1994) and maladaptively high openness,
as such concepts are strongly linked with bizarre interests, schizotypy (i.e., detecting
causal connections that do not exist), eccentricity, and peculiar or otherwise extreme
modes of thinking (Widiger, 2011b). The domain of openness has been split into
the two aspects openness and intellect, where high levels of the former is positively
correlated with psychoticism, whereas the latter is negatively related (Chmielewski,
Bagby, Markon, Ring, & Ryder, 2014; DeYoung, Grazioplene, & Peterson, 2012).
Alternative solutions have also been discussed. Using the HEXACOmodel Ash-
ton and Lee (2012) found that psychoticism traits loaded on a seventh factor and thus
posited the existence of a seventh schizotypy-dissociation factor, separate from FFM
openness (cf. Ashton, Lee, de Vries, Hendrickse, & Born, 2012). Others have in-
terpreted these data as really representing a five factor structure (Krueger &Markon,
2014). These alternative interpretations to FFM openness originally sprung from
the fact that measures of normal personality (e.g., the NEO–PI–R) did not reliably
predict maladaptive openness. Gore and Widiger (2013) argued that this peculiar
finding was due to the relatively late integration of openness into the FFM; Costa
and McCrae simply did not conceptualize openness as having any maladaptive vari-
ant. Instead, they initially viewed openness as only containing ideal personality traits
such as self-actualization, an open mind, and self-realization.
2.5.6 HEXACOHonesty–Humility and Agreeableness
The conceptualization and categorization of personality traits in the HEXACO
model diverge from the FFM in notable ways. The HEXACO–Agreeableness
(HEXACO–A) domain consists of facets Forgivingness, Gentleness, Flexibility, and
Patience (Lee & Ashton, 2004). These domains describe, respectively, tendencies to
be trusting vs. holding a grudge (i.e., forgivingness), being mild and lenient vs. be-
ing critical of others (i.e., gentleness), being willing to compromise and cooperate
vs. being stubborn and argumentative (i.e., flexibility), and finally one’s tendency to
have a high tolerance before expressing anger vs. having a short fuse (i.e., patience).
HEXACO–A is certainly similar to FFM agreeableness, but the main important dis-
tinction between models is that HEXACO–A includes temperamentalness and irri-
tability, which is categorized as neuroticism in the FFM taxonomy.
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The HH domain consists of facets Sincerity, Fairness, Greed Avoidance, and
Modesty. Sincerity reflects one’s tendency to be genuine in interpersonal relations
vs. being manipulative. Fairness reflects one’s disposition to take advantage of others
vs. a willingness to cheat, steal or defraud. Greed avoidance describes the tendency
to be uninterested in wealth and luxury vs. being greedy, wanting high social status
and wealth. Finally, modesty reflects a tendency to be unassuming. It is worth-
while to note that HH–Modesty is similar to NEO–PI–R–Modesty, but they are
not identical. The low pole of the former emphasizes a sense of entitlement, whereas
the low pole on the latter tends to emphasize bragging (Ashton & Lee, 2005). The
HEXACO domains and their relations with the FFM are described in more detail
elsewhere (Ashton & Lee, 2005, 2007, 2008). It should also be noted that the FFM
has been more explicitly modeled to mesh with the literature on PDs. In part, this is
because integration of normal and abnormal personality models started long before
the HEXACO came into existence (see e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992d; Trull, 1992).
This is not to say that the HEXACO cannot be used for the prediction of PDs. Es-
pecially on the domain level, it generates similar predictions to the FFM (cf. Ashton
et al., 2012; De Fruyt et al., 2013). The HEXACO model is particularly relevant to
the DT, as especially HH is a robust predictor of Machiavellianism, narcissism, and
psychopathy (Lee & Ashton, 2014).
2.5.7 Interfacing the Dark Triad and Five FactorModel
Having introduced the FFM in more detail, a brief description of how the DT con-
structs can be described using FFM terminology is in order. The DT is introduced
in more detail in the subsequent chapter, but interested readers may want to compare
typical trait term descriptors from Table 2.1 with expert-rated FFM prototypes of
Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy in Table 3.4. Expert-ratings are rat-
ings of PDs made by academics or clinicians which can be used for translation of PD
criteria into FFM terminology (Lynam &Widiger, 2001; Miller, 2019). These pro-
totype descriptions can be used for establishing whether there is consensus among
experts and also whether theoretical and empirical domains agree. The subsequent
description of each domain is mainly based on expert-ratings rather than results ob-
tained from self-reports, which are presented in Chapter 3.
All three DT constructs show low agreeableness scores, indicating that such in-
dividuals can be expected to be suspicious, deceptive, combative, boastful, and cal-
lous. Inherent in the domain of agreeableness is empathy (or in the case of the DT
constructs, lack thereof ), which is a construct that carries a large role in all three
constructs, but perhaps most crucially so for psychopathy, where it has been labeled
as the central deficit (Soderstrom, 2003; Verschuere et al., 2018). One may reason
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that Machiavellianism should be related to higher levels of empathy, as understand-
ing another perspective is perhaps necessary for successful exploitation (cf. Christie
& Geis, 1970). However, the situation is complicated, as empathy is typically di-
vided into cognitive and affective dimensions, where the former reflects the ability
to understand others (i.e., theory of mind), and the latter reflects the ability to be
aware of and experience other people’s emotions (Keysers & Gazzola, 2014). The
most recent study on this topic (Turner, Foster, & Webster, 2019) showed that af-
fective empathy was strongly negatively related (βs ranging from -.48 to -.65) to all
three DT constructs, while cognitive empathy was positively related to narcissism
(β = .41) and Machiavellianism (β = .31), but unrelated to psychopathy (β = .06).
This suggests that Machiavellianism (and narcissism) are inversely related to empa-
thy. These findings are questionable, as empathy is arguably an ability and not a trait,
insofar as empathizing requires effort (Cameron, Hutcherson, Ferguson, Scheffer,
& Inzlicht, 2016; Keysers & Gazzola, 2014). This entails that empathy is perhaps
more appropriate to measure using behavioral tests and not self-report methodology.
Curiously, self-reported empathy and behavioral tests of empathy are uncorrelated
(Kelly & Metcalfe, 2011; Melchers, Montag, Markett, & Reuter, 2015), suggesting
that empathy is a multifactorial construct. Alternatively, self-reported empathy and
behavioral tests of empathy may tap into different psychological processes.
Expert-rated conscientiousness is higher forMachiavellianism than the other two
DT constructs. In particular, orderliness, self-discipline, and deliberation are higher.
Psychopathy is associated with low conscientiousness and narcissism is intermedi-
ate. Accordingly, the main difference in conscientiousness is that Machiavellians are
theoretically more organized, dependable, has greater self-discipline, and are more
purposeful (i.e., more achievement-striving), than especially psychopaths, who are
notoriously careless, irresponsible, and aimless (Cleckley, 1988).
Extraversion is quite similar across the three constructs, with relatively high mean
values across the board. The facet warmth is low for all three, while gregariousness,
assertiveness, activity level, and excitement-seeking (for narcissism and psychopa-
thy) are above average. This translates to adventurousness, high energy, forceful or
dominant behavior, and sociable, in cases attention-seeking (especially in narcissism)
characteristics.
Neuroticism presents a more complicated picture, with psychopathy being associ-
ated with very low levels of anxiety (i.e., fearlessness), high levels of anger, low levels
of depression, self-consciousness, and emotional vulnerability (i.e., optimistic, glib,
and fearless), and high levels of impulsiveness (i.e., undercontrolled). Narcissism dis-
plays an even more complex pattern because of multidimensionality within the con-
struct. Narcissism is divisible into vulnerable and grandiose features, where the for-
mer is particularly prone to neuroticism and the latter has a general lack thereof. With
vulnerable narcissism, the most distinct neurotic features are self-consciousness and
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vulnerability which relates to the individual’s fragile self-image which is in constant
need of external support. In fact, recent contributions have identified that vulnera-
ble narcissism is mostly synonymous with neuroticism (Miller et al., 2018). Finally,
Machiavellians are theoretically more prone to depression, which is likely tied to their
cynical outlook on life, but are otherwise slightly less neurotic than average.
Openness to experience is the least significant domain with regards to the DT.
Narcissism is more strongly related to openness to fantasy than the other two, sug-
gesting that narcissists aremore imaginative whileMachiavellians aremore practically
oriented in their thinking. Psychopathy and narcissism are also more strongly related
to actions than is Machiavellianism. Perhaps the most interesting facet is openness to
emotions, where expert-rated profiles suggestMachiavellians are above average, while
narcissists and psychopaths are below average. Extremely low openness to emotions
is also described as alexithymia, or the inability to identify and express one’s own
emotional states, while its opposite is highly intense self-awareness. Research on
whether these relations are accurate unfortunately paints a rather unclear picture (see
e.g., Wastell & Booth, 2003).
2.5.8 A FFM-PDExample: Antisocial Personality Disorder
The content of this chapter has hitherto been focused on how PDs are currently con-
ceptualized by trait theorists, but this approach is rather abstract. Thus, I provide
a brief outline of how antisocial personality disorder can be conceptualized using a
trait model. Antisocial personality disorder is defined by the DSM-IV (APA, 1994,
pp. 649–650) in accordance with seven polythetic criteria:
(A)There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights
of others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of
the following:
1. failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated
by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest
2. deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others
for personal profit or pleasure
3. impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
4. irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or as-
saults
5. reckless disregard for safety of self or others
6. consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent
work behavior or honor financial obligations
7. lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having
hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another.
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There are also additional criteria, such as (B), that the individual is at least 18
years of age, but the presence of the criteria described above is most relevant here.
As an alternative approach to that outlined above, Lynam and Widiger (2001) had
experts describe prototypical cases of the ten DSM-IV (APA, 1994) PD diagnos-
tic categories using a FFM inventory. Each PD was described using all 30 facets.
For antisocial personality disorder, the characteristic facets were high angry hostility
and impulsiveness, low anxiousness and self-consciousness, all part of neuroticism;
high levels of assertiveness, activity, and excitement-seeking, which are all part of
extraversion; low agreeableness on all six facets; low dutifulness, self-discipline, and
deliberation, which are all part of conscientiousness; and finally high openness to ac-
tions. Intercorrelations among prototypes were also reported. Narcissistic personality
disorder and antisocial personality disorder prototypes correlated .80. Antisocial per-
sonality disorder further correlated -.74 with dependent personality disorder, which
is characterized by, as one may expect, high levels of neuroticism, relatively low lev-
els of extraversion, and high levels of agreeableness. This brief example shows how
traits relevant to PD can be conceptualized and further that the presence of PD is
heterogeneous. For more information about expert-ratings, FFM–PDmeta-analytic
results, the clinical utility of trait models and more, see Miller (2019).
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Table 2.1
Terms Associated with Adaptive and Maladaptive Variants of Five Factor Model Facets
Trait Maladaptively low Normal low Normal high Maladaptively high
Agreeableness
Trust Suspicious Cautious Trusting Gullible
Straightforwardness Deceptive Savvy Honest Guileless
Altruism Manipulative Greedy Frugal Selfless
Compliance Combative Critical Cooperative Generous
Modesty Boastful Confident Humble Yielding
Tender-mindedness Callous Strong Empathic Self-denigrating
Extraversion
Warmth Distant Formal Affectionate Intense attachments
Gregariousness Isolated Independent Sociable Attention-seeking
Assertiveness Submissive Passive Forceful Dominant
Activity-level Lethargic Slow-paced Energetic Frantic
Excitement-seeking Dull Cautious Adventurous Reckless
Positive emotions Grim Serious High-spirited Melodramatic
Neuroticism
Anxiousness Fearless Relaxed Vigilant Fearful
Angry hostility Exploitable Even-tempered Defiant Rageful
Depressiveness Overly optimistic Not easily discouraged Pessimistic Depressed
Self-consciousness Shameless Self-assured Embarrassed Uncertain of self
Impulsivity Overly restrained Restrained Self-indulgent Unable to resist impulses
Vulnerability Invincible Resilient Fragile Helpless
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Trait Maladaptively low Normal low Normal high Maladaptively high
Conscientiousness
Competence Disinclined Casual Efficient Perfectionistic
Order Careless Disorganized Organized Obsessively organized
Dutifulness Irresponsible Easy-going Dependable Rigidly principled
Achievement Aimless Carefree Purposeful Workaholic
Self-discipline Negligent Leisurely Self-disciplined Single-minded
Deliberation Hasty Quick to make decisions Thoughtful Ruminative
Openness
Fantasy Concrete Practical Imaginative Unrealistic
Aesthetics Disinterested Minimally interested Aesthetic interests Bizarre interests
Feelings Alexithymic Constricted Self-aware Intense
Actions Mechanized Predictable Unconventional Eccentric
Ideas Closed-minded Pragmatic Creative Peculiar
Values Dogmatic Traditional Open Radical
Note. Table contents are based on Widiger and Lowe (2008), but see also Lynam (2012).
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Chapter 3: The Dark Triad: Machiavellianism,
Narcissism, and Psychopathy
3.1 Structure of Literature Review
TheDT refers to three different, but overlapping, constructs: Machiavellianism, nar-
cissism, and psychopathy (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). These three constructs refer
to subclinical personality traits that can be conceptualized as (a) part of the Big Five
(O’Boyle, Forsyth, Banks, Story, & White, 2015), (b) as an extension (i.e., a sixth
factor) of them (Lee & Ashton, 2005, 2014), or (c) in addition to the Big Five (Paul-
hus & Williams, 2002). The term ”subclinical” refers to constructs that have typ-
ically been studied in clinical populations but are now studied in both clinical and
non-clinical settings. Such an approach is reasonable given that traits exist along
dimensions, but researchers nevertheless tend to emphasize this difference in sam-
pling. There is often an implicit assumption that subclinical refers to a less severe ver-
sion of a disorder, but that assumption is not necessarily true, being that subclinical
samples naturally cover wider ground and thus also include extreme cases (Furnham,
Richards, & Paulhus, 2013; Ray & Ray, 1982). It should be noted that Machiavel-
lianism is technically not a PD – as it is not recognized by psychiatric classification
systems such as the DSM – which both narcissism and psychopathy are (the latter is
sometimes erroneously referred to as antisocial personality disorder; Hare, 1996).
The clinical counterparts of narcissism and psychopathy both have extensive lit-
eratures that are somewhat distinct from the personality (i.e., subclinical) literature.
To add further complexity, the DT consists of three constructs, each with very large
nomological networks (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955), thoroughly reviewing each con-
struct goes far beyond the present scope. Thus, I place a number of restrictions on
this necessarily brief literature review. Each construct is introduced using historical
descriptions and with reference to its clinical (where applicable) description. Partic-
ularly important inventories, such as the Mach-IV (Christie & Geis, 1970), Narcis-
sistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979; Raskin & Terry, 1988), and
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003) are introduced to provide con-
ceptual coverage of each construct. As this thesis is concerned with the psychometric
status of the DT constructs – that is, to what extent they do and do not empirically
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overlap – I focus on studies aimed at validating these inventories. The structures of
these three inventories are highly important because of the large role they have played,
and continue to play, since their joint use in Paulhus and Williams’ (2002) seminal
contribution.1 As a consequence, more applied findings are deemphasized.
3.2 Machiavellianism
The concept of Machiavellianism is derived from the writings of the 16th-century
Italian political philosopher and diplomat, Niccolò Machiavelli. In his treatises, The
Prince (1532/1992) andTheDiscourses (1531/2007), Machiavelli presented his view of
people as untrustworthy, self-serving, and malevolent, and argued that a ruler would
better maintain power by utilizing exploitative and deceitful tactics. About four cen-
turies later, during the 1950s and 60s, psychologist Richard Christie became inter-
ested in the relation between personality and political ideology, and this led to an
investigation of Machiavellian attitudes such as having a cynical view of human na-
ture, low level of interpersonal affect, and minimal concern for conventional morality.
Ultimately, it led Christie towards the development of a theory which proposed that
the tendency to accept Machiavelli’s world view was a measurable individual differ-
ence variable (Christie & Geis, 1970).
In the landmarkmanuscript Studies inMachiavellianism, Christie andGeis (1970)
described a number of characteristics believed to be important in Machiavellianism.
First, a relative lack of affect in interpersonal relationships. The rationale behind this
characteristic is that in order to get what one wants, interpersonal distance and lack
of empathy helps in being able to use psychological leverage, manipulation and influ-
ence. A second characteristic is a lack of concern for conventional morality, by which
the authors mean that theMachiavellian cannot have qualms about lying, cheating, or
being deceitful. Third, having a gross lack of psychopathology is a reasonable hypoth-
esis as it enables the manipulator to stay in good contact with goals. If an individual
has low-functioning reality testing, manipulating others would likely be more diffi-
cult because the evaluation process of one’s manipulations would likely be impeded.
Fourth and finally, low ideological commitment refers to the idea that in order to be
a successful manipulator, one cannot let strongly held principles or ideologies get in
the way. Ends need to be met through pragmatic means.
In the attempt at trying to describe such an individual, Christie and Geis (1970)
collected statements from Machiavelli’s writings and asked participants how much
they agreed with them, and why. After much item discrimination and analysis, this
became the questionnaire that has now been in use for over 40 years. Christie and
Geis developed five renditions of the Mach scale. The vast majority of research has
1 Technically, Paulhus and Williams (2002) used the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRP; Paulhus,
Neumann, & Hare, in press) and not the PCL-R, but the SRP is derived from the PCL-R.
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been performed using Mach-IV (see table 3.1; Fehr, Samsom, & Paulhus, 1992), be-
cause the Mach-V, according to some critics, created more problems than it resolved
(Fehr et al., 1992; Hunter, Gerbing, & Boster, 1982; Ray, 1983).
The Mach-IV consists of 20 items in total which were reduced from a pool of
71 items (Mach-I and II; Christie & Geis, 1970). These items were intended to
reflectMachiavelli’s views of tactics and strategizing, morality, distrust, manipulation,
and other central themes Christie and Geis (1970) ascertained from Machiavelli’s
writings. Ultimately, the common themes were subjected to factor analysis, and a
three factor solution with factors ”Morality”, ”Tactics”, and ”Views”, was suggested.
The items and proposed factor solution are presented in Table 3.1. Although the
Mach-IV has been highly influential in the field, and is still used to this day, a lot
of criticism has been leveled against the inventory. One large inconsistency has been
the inability to find replicable factor solutions supported by reasonable theory. In my
literature review, solutions ranging from one to eight factors have been found (see
Table 3.2). Ultimately, most current research using the Mach-IV simply employ a
total score for the entire inventory.
The validity of the Mach-IV is questionable: some regard it reliable and valid
(Jones & Paulhus, 2009; Ramanaiah, Byravan, & Detwiler, 1994), while others hold
the opposite view (Panitz, 1989; Rauthmann, 2012b, 2013; Rauthmann & Will,
2011). For instance Rauthmann and Will (2011) criticized it for alleged shortcom-
ings concerning response style, varying reliability, varying factor structures, insuffi-
cient content and construct validity. Various factor solutions have been proposed for
the Mach-IV (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). The factor solutions do not only differ nu-
merically but also in content, which led Rauthmann and Will (2011) to argue that
Machiavellianism needs to be assessed in multiple dimensions containing cognitive,
emotional, motivational, and behavioral core themes. Ultimately, Rauthmann and
Will (2011) propose an outline for the development of a new assessment tool: the
”Multidimensional Machiavellianism Inventory”. Unfortunately, such an inventory
does not yet exist. Although, a new inventory purportedly measuring Machiavellian-
ism from a FFM perspective was recently created (Collison, Vize, Miller, & Lynam,
2018).
Since the publication of Studies in Machiavellianism, some things have been es-
tablished about Machiavellians. The construct helps to explain a variety of be-
havioral outcomes, including career choice and success (Moore, Katz, & Holder,
1995; O’Connor & Morrison, 2001), empathy, interpersonal perception (Rauth-
mann, 2012a), deceit (Jones & Paulhus, 2017), and many other outcomes (for re-
views, see Christie & Geis, 1970; Corzine, 1997; Fehr et al., 1992; Jones & Paulhus,
2009; Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1996).
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Table 3.1
Mach-IV Item Content and Original Factor Labels
No. Item Scoring Factor
1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something
unless it is useful to do so.
+ Tactics
2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what
they want to hear.
+ Tactics
3. One should take action only when sure it is morally
right.
- Tactics
4. Most people are basically good and kind. - Views
5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious
streak and it will come out when they are given a
chance.
+ Views
6. Honesty is the best policy in all cases. - Tactics
7. There is no excuse for lying to someone else. - Tactics
8. Generally speaking, men won’t work hard unless
they’re forced to do so.
+ Views
9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than
important and dishonest.
- Morality
10. When you ask someone to do something for you,
it is best to give the real reasons for wanting it
rather than giving reasons which might carry more
weight.
- Tactics
11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean,
moral lives.
- Views
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking
for trouble.
+ Tactics
13. The biggest difference between most criminals and
other people is that criminals are stupid enough to
get caught.
+ Views
14. Most men are brave. - Views
15. It is wise to flatter important people. + Tactics
16. It is possible to be good in all respects. - Tactics
17. Barnum was very wrong when he said there’s a
sucker born every minute.
- Views
18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here
and there.
+ Views
19. People suffering from incurable diseases should
have the choice of being put painlessly to death.
+ Morality
20. Most men forget more easily the death of their fa-
ther than the loss of their property.
+ Views
Note. The item order has been reported differently in many publications. We re-
port the original (Christie & Geis, 1970) order and their content suggestion in
the column “Factor”.
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Table 3.2
A Chronological Overview of Previous Factor Analyses of the Mach-IV
Study Suggested solution N
Christie and Geis (1970) 3 factors: Tactics, Views, Morality –
Christie and Lehmann
(1970)
5 factors: The analysis was not only of
the Mach-IV, but also included items
from an anomia index.
1482
Williams, Hazleton, and
Renshaw (1975)
4 factors: Communication Ethics,
Manipulative Strategies and
Assumptions, Dispositions Toward
People, Moral behavior.
246
Kuo and Marsella (1977)
5 factors: Two different solutions for
Chinese and American context
respectively. See publication for details.
128
Ahmed and Stewart
(1981) 5 factors: no factor names provided 122
Hunter, Gerbing, and
Boster (1982)
4 factors: Deceit, Flattery, Immorality,
Cynicism 351
Vleeming (1984) 4 factors: Honesty, Flattery, Views,Cynicism 123
O’Hair and Cody (1987) 3 factors: Deceit, Cynicism, Immorality 791
Panitz (1989) 7 and 8 factors: no factor namesprovided 133/117
Corral and Calvete (2000)
4 factors: Positive Interpersonal Tactics,
Negative Interpersonal Tactics, Positive
View of Human Nature, Negative View
of Human Nature
346
Andrew, Cooke, and
Muncer (2008)
4 factors: The authors conclude that
Corral and Calvete’s (2000) model is
“most acceptable”.
250
Rauthmann (2013)
A unidimensional IRTmodel used for
abbreviating the Mach-IV to a five item
short scale.
528
Monaghan, Bizumic, and
Sellbom (2016)
2 factors based on 10 items: Views and
Tactics 1696
Note. IRT = Item Response Theory (an introduction to IRT is available in Morizot,
Ainsworth, & Reise, 2009). The solution in Christie and Geis (1970) is not factor
analytic, but is included here because they presented a viable idea of what to expect
from such an analysis (cf. Christie & Lehmann, 1970).
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3.3 Narcissism
The concept of narcissism comes from the legend of Narcissus in Greek mythology:
a dismally vain hero who fell in love with his own reflection. This classic account
was later used as the foundation for conceptualizing narcissistic personality disorder
(NPD) at the end of the 19th century (Ellis, 1898). NPD drifted through a construct
transformation alongside the rest of the DSM , which first yielded vastly improved
assessable criteria, and subsequent dimensionalization and integration with the rest
of personality psychology: a process currently taking place.2
Narcissism is a very complex construct due to its inconsistent definitions in differ-
ent fields (i.e., clinical psychology, personality psychology). With the various turns
theDSM has taken, it is difficult to disentangle the terms narcissism andNPD.Many
support the notion that some narcissistic tendencies are healthy and even beneficial,
whereas when those same traits are excessively present they become problematic and
pass into the realm of abnormal and maladaptive behavior (Ronningstam, 2005).
The APA (2013, pp. 669–670) defines NPD using a general description and nine
specific behavioral criteria.
A pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for ad-
miration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early adulthood and present
in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:
1. Grandiosity with expectations of superior treatment from other people
2. Fixated on fantasies of power, success, intelligence, attractiveness, etc.
3. Self-perception of being unique, superior, and associated with high-status peo-
ple and institutions
4. Needing continual admiration from others
5. Sense of entitlement to special treatment and to obedience from others
6. Exploitative of others to achieve personal gain
7. Unwilling to empathize with the feelings, wishes, and needs of other people
8. Intensely envious of others, and the belief that others are equally envious of
them
9. Pompous and arrogant demeanor
The study of NPD is still highly active, but as with all other PDs, it is also increasingly
being studied in the general population. Most researchers would agree that NPD em-
phasizes the grandiose features of narcissism, as opposed to the vulnerable features
2 A plethora of material is available regarding the topic of narcissism. The reader interested in history
is directed to Levy, Ellison, and Reynoso (2011); for a thorough take on construct development, see
Pincus and Lukowitsky (2010); and an extensive review of narcissism is available in Ronningstam
(2005).
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(Miller et al., 2011b). The former reflects a sense of superiority, need of admira-
tion from others, exploitation and antagonism, whereas the latter describes insecu-
rity, defensiveness, and emotional instability (Wink, 1991). There are many different
models of narcissism currently being studied. Some of these models are particularly
concerned with understanding the differences between grandiose and vulnerable nar-
cissism (see e.g., Weiss & Miller, 2018). One way to investigate such differences is
by the use of expert rated FFM profiles, which are reported Table 3.3. From the per-
spective of the FFM, grandiose narcissism is positively associated with extraversion
and negatively with neuroticism. Vulnerable narcissism shows the opposite pattern,
with particularly conspicuous neurotic features (Miller et al., 2018). Both domains
share low agreeableness, albeit with slightly different configurations.
The multidimensionality in terms of grandiosity and vulnerability has been dif-
ficult to reconcile, especially considering that grandiose and vulnerable narcissism
can produce opposite external correlations (Kaufman, Weiss, Miller, & Campbell,
2018). One suggestion based on clinical observations is that a narcissistic individ-
ual may present with patterns of fluctuations between these two states. Studies as-
sessing within-individual variability using ambulatory assessment are currently being
conducted (see e.g., Edershile et al., 2019). Another suggestion for how these di-
mensions can be reconciled is the narcissism spectrum model, which specifies self-
importance, or entitlement, as a central feature binding grandiosity and vulnerability
together (Krizan &Herlache, 2018). Yet another model is the narcissistic admiration
and rivalry concept (Back et al., 2013), which emphasizes that grandiose narcissism is
heterogeneous and can be divided into narcissistic admiration and narcissistic rivalry.
In subclinical samples, narcissism is most commonly studied with the Narcissis-
tic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979; Raskin & Terry, 1988). In
fact, the frequency with which the NPI has been used has been criticized as being
too commonplace (e.g., Brown, Budzek, & Tamborski, 2009; Pincus & Lukowit-
sky, 2010). Cain, Pincus, and Ansell (2008) noted that the NPI has been the main
or only measure of narcissistic traits in approximately 77% of social and personality
psychology studies since 1985. However, Miller and Campbell (2011) argued that
the criticism of NPI has been blown out of proportion, but nevertheless agree that a
better assessment instrument can and should be developed.
The underlying factor structure of the NPI has been investigated by several re-
search groups, ultimately yielding various unstable results with two (Corry, Mer-
ritt, Mrug, & Pamp, 2008), three (Ackerman et al., 2011; Kubarych, Deary, &
Austin, 2004), four (Emmons, 1984, 1987), and seven (Raskin & Terry, 1988) fac-
tors. Raskin and Terry (1988) sought roughly eight components – because DSM-III
specified eight behavioral dimensions for NPD – but ultimately proposed a seven
factor solution. Neither the factor structure nor the issue of the relative merits of the
various scales have been resolved (Miller, Price, & Campbell, 2012b).
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Table 3.3
Expert Rated FFM Profiles of Grandiose and Vulnerable Narcissism
Narcissism
Facet Scale Grandiose Vulnerable
Neuroticism
Anxiety −.32 .60
Angry hostility .14 .61
Depression −.31 .60
Self-consciousness −.39 .58
Impulsiveness .07 .46
Vulnerability −.24 .62
Extraversion
Warmth .13 −.42
Gregariousness .28 −.30
Assertiveness .51 −.34
Activity .44 −.29
Excitement seeking .26 .10
Positive emotions .21 −.47
Openness to Experience
Fantasy −.03 −.05
Aesthetics .08 −.17
Feelings .04 .01
Actions .14 −.41
Ideas .04 −.17
Values −.18 −.23
Agreeableness
Trust −.08 −.50
Straightforwardness −.43 −.40
Altruism −.29 −.34
Compliance −.32 −.26
Modesty −.60 −.13
Tender mindedness −.16 −.24
Conscientiousness
Competence .14 −.44
Order .13 −.07
Dutifulness .03 −.19
Achievement striving .34 −.21
Self-discipline .24 −.29
Deliberation −.25 −.22
Note. Positive values indicated a positive bivariate correlation, negative values in-
dicate negative bivariate correlations. Ratings are taken from (Miller et al., 2014).
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In recent years, a number of narcissism inventories have been introduced to the
literature, some of which are anchored in the FFM (e.g., the Five-Factor Narcissism
Inventory Glover, Miller, Lynam, Crego, & Widiger, 2012). There are elaborate
theories specifying relations between psychological processes in different forms of
narcissism, but here I have settled with describing broad empirical relations between
grandiose narcissism, vulnerable narcissism, and the FFM. Readers interested in the
conceptualization of narcissism may consult Weiss, Campbell, Lynam, and Miller
(2019) and Crowe, Lynam, Campbell, and Miller (2019).
3.4 Psychopathy
Psychopathy is a personality disorder characterized by self-centeredness, callousness,
and a profound lack of empathy, which hinders the individual from forming warm and
healthy emotional relationships with others (Hare, 1999). In 1941, Hervey Cleckley
published the seminal work The Mask of Sanity, which is still used as a reference for
describing how psychopaths behave. Cleckley described the typical psychopath on
the basis of clinical observations of adult male patients categorized as “psychopathic”.
He introduced 16 characteristics typical of the psychopath: superficial charm, absence
of delusions, absence of nervousness or psychoneuroticism, unreliability, insincerity,
lack of remorse, antisocial behavior, poor judgment, pathologic egocentricity and in-
capacity for love, lack of affect, specific loss of insight, unresponsiveness in interper-
sonal relations, fantastic and uninviting behavior, suicides rarely carried out, imper-
sonal sex life, and failure to meet life plans. These criteria were used as a starting point
for Robert D. Hare during the creation of the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL) and in the
subsequent development of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003).
The PCL-R has since become the standard assessment instrument for psychopathy
(Patrick, 2006) against which new measures of psychopathy are often compared.
The PCL-R is comprised of 20 criteria assessed on a 3-point ordinal scale (0, 1,
or 2), for a maximum of 40 points. Although norms differ, norms from the U.S.
are such that a score of 30 tends to be the diagnostic threshold for psychopathy. The
criteria are assessed as part of a semi-structured interview, which requires special qual-
ifications. The standard PCL-R model divides the 20 items among two factors with
two facets each. Factor 1 is divided into the facets ”Interpersonal” and ”Affective”,
while Factor 2 consists of facets ”Lifestyle” and ”Antisocial”. Thus, Factor 1 describes
more emotional (or lack thereof ) aspects of psychopathy such as lack of remorse or
glibness, while Factor 2 reflects externalizing behaviors such as impulsivity and crim-
inality (Hare & Neumann, 2008). Evidence suggest that the PCL-R is dimensional,
both globally and at the factor level in a four factor model (Guay, Ruscio, Knight, &
Hare, 2007). This has a number of implications, including that psychopathy seems to
36 Chapter 3. The Dark Triad: Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy
be ”a coalescence of extremes on numerous dimensional traits” (Hare & Neumann,
2005, p. 62). For further discussion about this, the reader is directed to Hare, Neu-
mann, and Mokros (2018).
While the popularity of the PCL-R is unrivaled, it also has certain limitations.
Probably the main limitation is that it takes the form of a semi-structured interview
which entails that special training is necessary for its administration, which in turn
leads to that it is almost exclusively applied in clinical settings. Based on the real-
ization that personality disorders, including psychopathy, are dimensional and not
categorical (Edens, Marcus, Lilienfeld, & Poythress, 2006), quicker alternative as-
sessment procedures for assessing psychopathy were needed. Thus, a number of self-
report inventories have been developed for both clinical and subclinical use. Some
of these measures were explicitly modeled after the PCL-R – one such example be-
ing the SRP (Paulhus et al., in press) – whereas other measures included features not
emphasized in Hare’s model. Developments in this area have recently been reviewed
(Sellbom, Lilienfeld, Fowler, & McCrary, 2018).
Perhaps the main difference between these emerging measures is the differential
emphasis on fearless dominance, otherwise known as boldness. The relevance of bold-
ness is intimately linked with another point of contention, namely the importance of
aggression and violence to psychopathy (Hare & Neumann, 2010; Skeem & Cooke,
2010). The triarchic model of psychopathy (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009) de-
scribes psychopathy as a joint constellation of boldness (i.e., social dominance, fear-
lessness, emotional resilience, and stress immunity), meanness (i.e., aggressiveness,
social detachment, and callousness), and disinhibition (i.e., impulse control deficits
and externalization of blame) (Patrick et al., 2009). Some have argued that if bold-
ness is excluded, psychopathy looks much like antisocial personality disorder (Wall,
Wygant, & Sellbom, 2015), which is an equivocation Hare argued against more than
two decades ago (Hare, 1996). Others argue that boldness is irrelevant to psychopa-
thy because it is modestly correlated with the two PCL-R factors and others measures
of externalizing behavior (Lynam & Miller, 2012). Whether boldness should be in-
cluded in psychopathy is a difficult judgment, because it hinges on whether psychopa-
thy as a concept should be anchored in theoretical descriptions, such as Cleckley’s
seminal contributions, or whether it should be anchored empirically. Some scholars
have made the argument that boldness should not be included because it is does not
predict clinically relevant criteria beyond meanness and disinhibition (Gatner, Dou-
glas, &Hart, 2016). Another line of reasoning is that boldness is particularly relevant
for describing successful psychopathy (Persson & Lilienfeld, 2019). This discussion is
ongoing and opinions differ greatly about how the field should move forward (Miller
& Lynam, 2015; Patrick et al., 2019). Going further into the intricacies of these
positions is unnecessary for the present purposes. Suffice it to say that the triarchic
model is utilized in the present thesis because it arguably maps particularly well onto
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successful psychopathy (Persson & Lilienfeld, 2019). In FFM terminology, bold-
ness is highly positively correlated with emotional stability (r = .73; Lilienfeld et al.,
2016), negatively with all facets of neuroticism with the exception of impulsivity, pos-
itively correlated with surgent extraversion and openness, negatively correlated with
straightforwardness and modesty (both facets of agreeableness), as well as moder-
ately positively correlated with competence (Poy, Segarra, Esteller, López, & Moltó,
2014).
A number of models attempt to explain the differences between subclinical and
clinical psychopathy.3 There are three common models that deserve brief attention
(Hall & Benning, 2006; Hall, Venables, & Benning, 2018; Lilienfeld, Watts, &
Smith, 2015). First, perhaps the most intuitive view that’s descended from Cleckley,
is the differential-severity model, which implies a less extreme variant of psychopa-
thy. That is to say a difference in degree, not in kind. In this view the same core traits
are believed to be manifested, albeit to a lesser extent, than in clinical psychopa-
thy. Second, the moderated-expression model suggests that subclinical psychopaths
are more intact, meaning that there may be protective factors at play contributing
to adaptivity. Logically, this must go both ways, meaning that it is possible that
clinical psychopathy is an exacerbated variant of subclinical psychopathy. Third, the
differential-configuration model suggests that the relative contribution of traits to
behavior is different in subclinical psychopathy. This view is particularly relevant for
the triarchic model of psychopathy, which specifies psychopathy as a joint constel-
lation of boldness, meanness, and disinhibition (Patrick et al., 2009). It should be
noted that these three different models, though developed for psychopathy, are not
necessarily limited only to psychopathy. In the DT, narcissism, too, is a subclinical
construct. There is no associated clinical condition for Machiavellianism, but a per-
suasive case has been made that Machiavellianism is embedded within psychopathy
(Miller & Lynam, 2015). Thus, it stands to reason that Machiavellianism itself could
be a differential-severity, moderated-expression, or differential-configuration type of
phenomenon, insofar as it could be a milder variant of psychopathy.
3.5 TheDark Triad
TheDT emerged as a consequence of the substantial commonalities betweenMachi-
avellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). The seminal
contribution made by Paulhus and Williams (2002), was to illustrate that these three
constructs showed both substantial similarity and dissimilarity, hence favoring their
joint study. Since this contribution, a lot of work has been conducted on trying to (a)
better understand the nomological networks of the respective constructs, (b) whether
3 Subclinical psychopathy can, for the present purposes, be defined negatively, thus referring to indi-
viduals who are not institutionalized (cf. Persson & Lilienfeld, 2019).
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the DT share a common core, (c) the developmental pathways of the DT constructs,
(d) the respective factorial structures for measures of each construct.
Regarding (a), the nomological networks of these constructs is not of central in-
terest presently. Suffice it to say that the DT has been studied in relation to a large
set of variables, including: normal personality (Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006), mating
strategy and other evolutionary phenomena (e.g., Jonason, Li, Webster, & Schmitt,
2009; Lyons, Khan, Sandman, &Valli, 2018), work behavior (Forsyth, Banks, &Mc-
Daniel, 2012), impulsivity and self control (Jonason & Tost, 2010; Jones & Paulhus,
2011b), intelligence (O’Boyle, Forsyth, Banks, & Story, 2013), values and morality
(Jonason, Strosser, Kroll, Duineveld, & Baruffi, 2015; Kajonius, Persson, & Jonason,
2015), Internet behavior (Buckels, Trapnell, & Paulhus, 2014; Curtis, Rajivan, Jones,
& Gonzalez, 2018), and deceitfulness (Jones & Paulhus, 2017). A number of reviews
have been published that describe these and other findings in more detail (Furnham
et al., 2013; Furnham, Richards, Rangel, & Jones, 2014; Koehn, Okan, & Jonason,
2018; Muris, Merckelbach, Otgaar, &Meijer, 2017; Paulhus, 2014). A book has also
recently been published summarizing this diverse literature (Lyons, 2019). Further-
more, FFM rated expert prototypes of all three DT constructs have been generated
such that observed scores can be matched to theoretical expectations. These profiles
are reported in Table 3.4.
Regarding (b), the common core in the DT, a number of suggestions have been
made, including: disagreeableness (Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006; Paulhus & Williams,
2002), low trait HH (Hodson et al., 2018), exploitation (Jonason et al., 2009; Kajo-
nius, Persson, Rosenberg, & Garcia, 2016), low empathy (Jones & Paulhus, 2011a),
and manipulation–callousness (Jones & Figueredo, 2013). These suggestions are not
mutually exclusive. In fact, all of them arguably overlap to a great degree, albeit differ
in specificity (e.g., exploitation is more specific than disagreeableness).
Regarding (c), a large literature exist about the development of psychopathy and
narcissism, but less focus has been put into the DT studied jointly, although there
are exceptions (e.g., De Clercq, Hofmans, Vergauwe, De Fruyt, & Sharp, 2017).
Accordingly, there is a substantial literature on various aspects of the DT, but the
remainder of this thesis focuses on (d), specifically the factorial structures of the DT
constructs.
The extant measures (i.e., the Mach-IV, NPI, and SRP) of the DT constructs
required the administration of more than 100 items. For that reason, two important
shortmeasures were developed for the joint study of all threeDT constructs. These are
the 27 item SD3 (Jones & Paulhus, 2014) and the 12 item DD (Jonason &Webster,
2010). As noted above, both the Machiavellianism and narcissism literatures have
been plagued by measurement difficulties. The psychopathy literature has arguably
been more successful, although controversy certainly remains (Hare & Neumann,
2010; Skeem & Cooke, 2010).
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Table 3.4
Expert Rated FFM Profiles of Dark Triad Traits
DT Trait
FFM Domain/Facet Machiavellianism Narcissism Psychopathy
Agreeableness 1.55 1.40 1.30
Trust 1.42 1.42 1.73
Straightforwardness 1.28 1.83 1.13
Altruism 1.28 1.00 1.33
Compliance 2.08 1.58 1.33
Modesty 1.89 1.08 1.00
Tender-mindedness 1.36 1.50 1.27
Conscientiousness 3.54 2.81 2.42
Competence 3.69 3.25 4.20
Order 3.97 2.92 2.60
Dutifulness 2.53 2.42 1.20
Achievement-striving 3.86 3.92 3.07
Self-discipline 3.42 2.08 1.87
Deliberation 3.78 2.25 1.60
Extraversion 3.15 3.52 3.47
Warmth 2.06 1.42 1.73
Gregariousness 3.39 3.83 3.67
Assertiveness 4.14 4.67 4.47
Activity 3.78 3.67 3.67
Excitement-seeking 2.81 4.17 4.73
Positive emotions 2.72 3.33 2.53
Neuroticism 2.42 2.74 2.30
Anxiety 2.39 2.33 1.47
Angry hostility 3.28 4.08 3.87
Depression 2.94 2.42 1.40
Self-consciousness 1.92 1.50 1.07
Impulsiveness 2.08 3.17 4.53
Vulnerability 1.92 2.92 1.47
Openness to Experience 2.85 3.10 2.98
Fantasy 2.28 3.75 3.07
Aesthetics 2.77 3.25 2.33
Feelings 3.31 1.92 1.80
Actions 2.94 4.08 4.27
Ideas 2.78 2.92 3.53
Values 3.03 2.67 2.87
Note. Mean values (range = 1–5) on each trait are reported for the expert prototypes.
Sources for the expert rated prototypes are found in (Machiavellianism; Miller, Hy-
att, Maples-Keller, Carter, & Lynam, 2017b; narcissism; Lynam & Widiger, 2001;
and psychopathy; Miller, Lyman, Widiger, & Leukefeld, 2001).
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Because of these existing problems, it was logical to investigate the properties of the
more recently developed short measures closely, as well. Not long after the introduc-
tion of these two measures, substantive criticism was published, especially regarding
the DD (Maples, Lamkin, & Miller, 2014; Miller et al., 2012a), which was deemed
to be too brief to be useful (although see also; Jonason & Luévano, 2013).
3.5.1 Machiavellianism and Psychopathy: One or Two?
Whether Machiavellianism and psychopathy are distinct has been revisited relatively
recently (Miller et al., 2019; Miller, Hyatt, Maples-Keller, Carter, & Lynam, 2017b;
Persson, Kajonius, & Garcia, 2017, 2019). Originally, the distinctiveness of the DT
constructs was disputed by McHoskey and colleagues (McHoskey, 1995; McHoskey
et al., 1998). They argued that in nonclinical samples, such as student samples, all
three constructs are equivalent. Their arguments posed a significant threat to the
discriminant validity of, especially, Machiavellianism. Subsequently, Paulhus and
colleagues published a series of articles confirming their overlap but establishing suf-
ficient discriminant validity to recommend measuring all three variables simultane-
ously (e.g., Paulhus & Williams, 2002). The authors argued that a failure to include
the other two DT members renders ambiguous any research on one member alone.
This sentiment was echoed by others ”by controlling for shared variance, the relation-
ship between each of the [DD] subscales and the Big Five can be assessed without
the contamination of the other two Dark Triad traits” (Jonason, Kaufman, Webster,
& Geher, 2013, p. 83).
McHoskey et al. (1998) were first in elaborating on the supposed distinctiveness
of Machiavellianism and psychopathy, and argued that such distinctiveness does not
exist. They argued that the purported difference Machiavellianism and psychopathy
arose from the fact that the former was studied by social psychologists, and the latter
by clinical psychologists. As these fields were not – and still to this day are not – sub-
stantially integrated, that allowed for two parallel streams of research on ostensively
the same topic.
One key issue was the characterization of individuals with high levels of Machi-
avellianism as having ”gross lack of psychopathology” (Christie & Geis, 1970, p. 3),
which goes against the idea that Machiavellianism and psychopathy are the same
thing. However, the subject gets complicated by the fact that evidence suggests that
Machiavellianism is mostly related to the PCL Factor 1, which describes affective
problems, while Factor 2 describes antisociality (Fehr et al., 1992). The authors
posited that these findings reflect ”…that psychopaths simply may be high Machs
who have run up against the law.” (Fehr et al., 1992, p. 87). Accordingly, Fehr et
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al. (1992) seemingly subsume psychopathy under Machiavellianism, which if noth-
ing else is counter-intuitive given the much longer history of psychopathy.4 In any
case, regarding the supposed ”gross lack of psychopathology”, multiple studies have
found moderate positive correlations between Machiavellianism and anxiety (Fehr
et al., 1992), which goes against the view that Machiavellians are stable individu-
als with intact self-control resources. Furthermore, Machiavellians were believed to
be scheming individuals with higher levels of intelligence, but such evidence has not
been found (O’Boyle et al., 2013). Similarly, Machiavellianism is theoretically linked
with intact self-control, but this, too, has not panned out empirically. Although re-
sults are mixed, with some finding theoretically expected results (Jones & Paulhus,
2011b). Nevertheless, meta-analytic findings have shown a positive association be-
tween impulsivity and Machiavellianism (Vize, Lynam, Collison, & Miller, 2018b).
It is difficult to understand howMachiavellians can be long-term planners who care-
fully manipulate their surroundings in order to achieve their goals while at the same
time being impulsive.
Concurrently with the studies presented in this thesis, two meta-analyses were
conducted that established the empirical overlap among DT constructs. Vize et al.
(2018b) showed that the nomological networks ofMachiavellianism and psychopathy
overlap substantially, while narcissism is slightly more independent. Indeed, the sim-
ilarity in nomological networks were: narcissism and psychopathy rICC = .60, narcis-
sism and Machiavellianism rICC = .57, and Machiavellianism and psychopathy rICC
= .86 (Vize et al., 2018b). One limitation of this study is that it was conducted us-
ing domain level information. The authors themselves also make the point that many
of the samples were student and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) samples, and
high Machiavellianism may be more likely to be found in competitive environments.
These findings were subsequently updated in another meta-analysis (Vize, Col-
lison, Miller, & Lynam, 2018a). This study utilized meta-analytic structural equa-
tion modelling (MASEM) in order to control for shared variance among the DT
constructs. In this way, the authors could analyze the effects of partialling variance
from the other constructs (partialling will be discussed in more depth later on). The
main takeaway, the authors argue, is that partialling variance can substantially alter
the meaning of constructs. For instance, they found that residualized narcissism was
actually dissimilar to residualized psychopathy and Machiavellianism, which clearly
shows that the constructs have changed in content (Vize et al., 2018a).
Most recently, Miller et al. (2019) and Lyons (2019) independently synthesized
the conceptual and methodological difficulties that have become evident in recent
years. Miller et al. (2019) concisely summarize these shortcomings in five points:
4 Furthermore, I would argue that this debate should be settled empirically, in particular by way of
establishing which construct has the widest nomological network (i.e., greatest construct validity)
and can best be explained theoretically (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).
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1) failure to recognize the multidimensional nature of the three DT con-
structs, 2) failure of existing Machiavellianism measures to adequately
capture the construct, 3) failure to acknowledge the interpretive perils
posed by the prescribed multivariate approach to data analysis, 4) failure
to adequately test claims of differential validity among DT constructs,
and 5) over-reliance on cross-sectional studies using single methods in
samples of convenience.
In addition to this list, Lyons (2019, pp. 6–7) also highlight a lack of replication inDT
research and post-hoc inventions of hypotheses. An additional point not mentioned
in either source is that the DT constructs also seems to be possible to subsume under
normal personality models (see next section), which leads to questions regarding the
utility of the DT model, more generally.
3.5.2 TheDT or Normal Personality Models
As we have seen, numerous studies have covered the nomological network of Machi-
avellianism, both by itself and with reference to the other DT constructs. Another
stream of research has attempted to describe the DT content using normal personal-
ity models, such as the FFM andHEXACO.Meta-analytic estimates of the relations
between the DT constructs, FFM, and HEXACO are presented in Table 3.5. Prob-
ably the most important study on this topic is a meta-analysis investigating both the
relation between the DT constructs and FFM domains (O’Boyle et al., 2015), but
also between FFM facets and narcissism and psychopathy (at that point, there were
not enough data to analyze FFM facets andMachiavellianism). The most substantial
correlations corrected for unreliability betweenMachiavellianism and the FFMwere:
-.50, for agreeableness, and -.27 for conscientiousness. The FFM domains explained
30% variance in Machiavellianism. Findings for psychopathy were highly similar, as
agreeableness correlated -.53 and -.39 for conscientiousness. This model explained
41% of the variance in psychopathy. As opposed to the two other DT constructs, nar-
cissism was more strongly related to extraversion than agreeableness, although both
were substantial correlates, with the former coefficient being .49 and the latter -.36.
This FFM model explained 63% of the variance in narcissism (O’Boyle et al., 2015).
The authors went further and tested previously proposed FFM facet models of
narcissism and psychopathy. The 18 facets proposed for psychopathy explained 88%
of the variance in psychopathy, which suggests that FFM facet models can basically
replace other self-report measures of psychopathy. For narcissism, the effects were a
bit smaller, with the entire model consisting of 13 facets explaining 42% of the vari-
ance. The authors note that psychopathy and Machiavellianism were highly similar
and argue that if one construct is to be subsumed in the other, it is more appropriate
to subsume Machiavellianism in psychopathy. Many existing models of psychopathy
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Table 3.5
Meta-Analytic Relations between Normal Personality Domains and Dark Triad Traits
O’Boyle et al. Muris et al.
DT Trait Trait r rc r rpartial
Machiavellianism Agreeableness −.39 −.50 −.43 −.25
Conscientiousness −.21 −.27 −.25 −.13
Extraversion −.01 −.01 −.08 −.16
Neuroticism .09 −.11 .07 .13
Openness −.04 −.05 −.05 −.05
Honesty-Humility −.61 −.23
Narcissism Agreeableness −.29 −.36 −.21 −.03
Conscientiousness .09 .11 −.01 .16
Extraversion .40 .49 .31 .37
Neuroticism −.16 −.20 −.04 −.05
Openness .20 .25 .15 .19
Honesty-Humility −.41 −.26
Psychopathy Agreeableness −.42 −.53 −.46 −.28
Conscientiousness −.31 −.39 −.27 −.23
Extraversion .04 .05 .01 −.05
Neuroticism .05 .06 −.07 −.10
Openness .04 .05 −.03 −.08
Honesty-Humility −.54 −.28
Note. O’Boyle et al. = data from (O’Boyle, Forsyth, Banks, Story, & White, 2015);
Muris et al. = data from (Muris, Merckelbach, Otgaar, & Meijer, 2017). N s vary
between 607–8,500 (Muris, Merckelbach, Otgaar, & Meijer, 2017) and 11,326–
45,885 (O’Boyle, Forsyth, Banks, Story, &White, 2015). rc = correlation corrected
for unreliability. rpartial = effect sizes that were controlled for the shared variance
among the three traits.
contain components that are clearly Machiavellian, such as manipulation (sometimes
explicitly so, e.g., the ”Machiavellian Egocentricity” subscale in the psychopathic per-
sonality inventory; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996).
Another important study was a smaller meta-analysis conducted recently (Hod-
son et al., 2018). In this study, 1,402 participants from four different studies were
analyzed in a latent variable model usingDT domains and facet level HEXACOdata.
Their meta-analytic estimates betweenHH andDT domains was near identity, with a
latent correlation of -.95. The authors argue in favor of using HEXACO over ”ad-hoc
combinations of the Big Five and Dark Triad” (Hodson et al., 2018, p. 128), because
the HEXACO accounts for more variance in various outcomes. What construct to
choose, and whether one construct should replace another, are difficult questions that
will be discussed in more depth in the discussion. Those issues notwithstanding, nu-
merous studies have now indicated that Machiavellianism can be subsumed under
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psychopathy, and that normal personality trait models such as the FFM and HEX-
ACO show very high overlap with theDT. A recent addition to the literature has been
the suggestion of reconceptualizing HH as a domain of selfishness (Diebels, Leary,
& Chon, 2018), although this suggestion need further study. In any case, these de-
velopments naturally leads to questions regarding whether the DT model adds to or
subtracts from the overarching personality literature.
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Chapter 4: Methods
The present chapter describes two mostly unrelated methodological topics. First,
I briefly introduce latent variable models (distinctions between Confirmatory Fac-
tor Analysis (CFA), Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Item Response Theory
(IRT), especially) and what these models are used for, including assessment of di-
mensionality, reliability, and validity. Second, I briefly describe online data collec-
tion, which is a relatively new phenomenon that has increased in popularity in the last
few years. In particular, I briefly describe the use of MTurk as a strategy of data col-
lection. Both of these topics are highly relevant for the present thesis. Collecting data
online (as opposed to via paper-and-pencil) is particularly useful when large sets of
data are required, which is preferable in the process of validating psychological con-
structs. Latent variable models are explained in some detail because such models are
of great importance for establishing a foundation of measurement for the constructs
psychologists are interested in. Indeed, Crede and Harms (2019, p. 19) provide a
clear summary of the importance of latent variable models for applied research:
The findings from CFA-based measurement models are typically used
to establish the discriminant and convergent validity of scores on mea-
sures of a set of variables. Specifically, researchers frequently use CFA to
assess whether the hypothesized item–construct relationships (e.g. re-
sponses to items from scale A reflect only construct X1, responses to
items from scale B reflect only construct X2, etc.), and the hypothesized
distinction among latent constructs (e.g. construct X1 is distinct from
X2) are reflected in the observed data. This finding is then used to jus-
tify the aggregation of certain scores (e.g. responses to items from scale
A) into overall indicators of constructs that are then, in turn, used in all
subsequent analyses (e.g. multiple regression, HLM [hierarchical linear
models], path analyses). That is, the findings from CFA-based measure-
ment models are used to make the argument that variables have been
appropriately measured and that the necessary-but-not-sufficient condi-
tion of measurement quality has been met.
Thus, latent variable models are typically used as a foundation on which subse-
quent empirical research rests. One of my main arguments in this thesis is that the
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importance of good measurement has been been given insufficient attention in DT
research. The models utilized herein are particularly useful for determining dimen-
sionality, or how many sources of variance a given set of data contains. This is crucial
in the determination to what extent the DT constructs overlap and diverge, and by
extension informs the investigation of whether these constructs should be studied
together, apart, or perhaps be substituted.
4.1 Latent Variable Models
Psychologists typically use unit-weighted composite scores (e.g., the mean or sum
score for some set of items) in statistical analyses (e.g., regression analyses). In such
analyses, reliability is assumed to be perfect (i.e., 1) and the underlying structure of
the composite score is assumed. In order to account for measurement error and to
better understand what such scores represent, Factor Analysis (FA) is employed as
the standard statistical method among personality psychologists. FA is a subset of
a broader statistical framework called Structural Equation Modeling (SEM; Kline,
2016).1
The history of factor analytic models is not relevant here, but one may note that
many of the models used today have their origin in the study of intelligence (Spear-
man, 1904). The fundamental logic of FA lies in the attempt to explain, or account
for, observed scores using a statistical model. This is done for the purpose of explain-
ing observed scores (i.e., manifest or indicator variables) in a reduced set of unob-
served factors (i.e., latent variables). In such models, observed scores are assumed
to be caused by the latent variable, which means that the covariance between indi-
cators should be zero when the latent variable is present (Hoyle & Duvall, 2004).2
This is predicated on a so-called common cause model (e.g., Borsboom, 2008; Fried
& Cramer, 2017; Schmittmann et al., 2013), meaning that observed responses are
caused by a common factor. For instance, one may collect data on a psychological
construct such as empathy, and posit based on previous theory (e.g., Shamay-Tsoory
&Aharon-Peretz, 2007) that there are two factors (i.e., two different common causes)
underlying the responses. In such a case, one would use either EFA or CFA in or-
der to explore (i.e., EFA) or test one or multiple hypotheses (i.e., CFA) whether two
factors are sufficient explanation for the observed data.
1 There are also other related statistical techniques, such as Item Response Theory (IRT; Morizot,
Ainsworth, & Reise, 2009; Reise & Waller, 2009), which are together usually discussed under the
broad label latent variable models (see e.g., Borsboom et al., 2016).
2 Latent variable models where latent variables are believed to cause the responses (i.e., observed
scores) are called reflective models. There are also formative models, where the opposite relation
holds, meaning that the indicators are believed to constitute the latent variable (Bollen & Lennox,
1991; Fried, 2017).
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FA specifies a statistical model in which the relationship between manifest and
latent variables are referred to as factor loadings (λ).3 In EFA, all factor loadings
are freely estimated whereas in CFA a stricter model is specified that typically forces
some loadings to zero. These loadings are called target (or primary) and non-target
(or secondary) loadings. Factor loadings tend to be standardized in publications and
can thus be interpreted as analogous to standardized regressions coefficients. Latent
variable models also allow for computation of factor scores, which are typically used to
determine a participant’s score on a latent variable (Brown, 2015, pp. 31–32). Factor
score estimation is a complex issue that entails a number of different problems in their
own right (Grice, 2001).
One can specify an unlimited number of different models, but four models are
particularly relevant here. They are: (A) the unidimensional model, (B) the correlated
factor model, (C) the second-order model, and (D) the bifactor model. These mod-
els are represented in Figure 4.1, where manifest variables are depicted as squares and
latent variables as circles. The DT is used to highlight how a measurement model of
these particular constructs can be presented graphically. The logic of the unidimen-
sional model is that one factor can account for the variance in all observed scores.
The correlated factor model introduces multiple factors that are allowed to correlate,
which is a realistic strategy given that psychological variables are almost never un-
correlated. The second-order model and bifactor models are relatively similar. The
former is potentially applicable when lower-order factors are substantially correlated
and there is a higher-order factor hypothesized to account for relations among those
lower-order factors. Bifactor models are more appropriate when one believes there is
substantial commonality between items and alsomultiple specific domains that are in-
dependently valuable, having partitioned variance from the general factor. The main
difference between these models is that the second-order model entails that shared
variance in specific factors is caused by the general factor (Gignac, 2016).
The benefits of FA for psychological research is that psychologists tend to be in-
terested in decomposing complex processes into smaller parts (Gustafsson & Åberg-
Bengtsson, 2010). In many cases one may need multivariate statistical tools in order
to do so. However, there are numerous issues with the different varieties of latent
variable models – ranging from the esoteric, such as the common cause assumption
(Schmittmann et al., 2013) – to more concrete issues such as indicator skewness and
sample size (Gorsuch, 1974; Schmitt, Sass, Chappelle, &Thompson, 2018; Sellbom
&Tellegen, 2019). Furthermore, there are well known issues with applyingCFAs, es-
pecially to longer personality inventories, as model fit (i.e., how well the factor model
3 For deeper introductions to FA and SEM, excellent and relatively non-technical texts have been
written detailing the procedure (Brown, 2015; Kline, 2016). More technical literature is also avail-
able (Mulaik, 2009; Pedhazur, 1997; Raykov & Marcoulides, 2012).
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Machiavellianism 1
Machiavellianism 2
Machiavellianism 3
Narcissism 1
Narcissism 2
Narcissism 3
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Psychopathy 2
Psychopathy 3
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Machiavellianism 3
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Narcissism 2
Narcissism 3
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Psychopathy 2
Psychopathy 3
(B)
DT
M
N
P
Machiavellianism 1
Machiavellianism 2
Machiavellianism 3
Narcissism 1
Narcissism 2
Narcissism 3
Psychopathy 1
Psychopathy 2
Psychopathy 3
(C)
DT
M
N
P
Machiavellianism 1
Machiavellianism 2
Machiavellianism 3
Narcissism 1
Narcissism 2
Narcissism 3
Psychopathy 1
Psychopathy 2
Psychopathy 3
(D)
Figure 4.1. Examples of common factor models. A = Unidi-
mensional, B = Correlated factors, C = Higher–Order, and D =
Bifactor.
accounts for the observed data) is often far below recommendations in such circum-
stances (Hopwood & Donnellan, 2010). This issue is caused by the rigidity of CFA,
as CFAmodels freely estimate primary loadings but force secondary loadings to zero,
which is unlikely the true population value, thus leading to model misfit. As a conse-
quence, less restrictive models have been developed. One such popular framework is
Exploratory Structural Equation Modeling (ESEM; Asparouhov &Muthén, 2009).
A flowchart of the decision process covering the appropriate use of models from the
FA family has recently been published (Schmitt et al., 2018), but is not elaborated
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on here. Suffice it to say that model choice is complex decision making process in its
own right.
4.1.1 Item ResponseTheory
IRT models are another kind of latent variable models commonly used for closer in-
spection of item properties. In contrast to classical test theory (Lord&Novick, 1968)
– where reliability is constant across the latent trait – IRT models allow estimation
of conditional reliability (Nicewander, 2018). This means that reliability can be as-
sessed across different levels of the latent trait. As with FA models, there are many
different variants of IRT models. The one relevant to this thesis is called the Graded
ResponseModel (GRM). It is used for estimating two item parameters, alpha (α) and
beta (β).4 The α parameter, also known as the discrimination parameter, is similar to
a factor loading. The α parameter shows how strongly an item relates to a given latent
trait theta (θ) and an item with high discrimination entails better differentiation of
individuals. The converse, a low discrimination parameter, means that endorsement
rates do not change substantially across the latent trait. The β parameter is a loca-
tion or threshold parameter. The number of β parameters are set to k-1, where k is
the number of response categories in need of estimation. This means that for five re-
sponse categories, each β parameter (i.e., β1–β4) relates to the level of the latent trait
at which the next higher response category has at least 50% probability of being en-
dorsed (e.g., β1 denotes answering option 1 vs. 2, 3, 4, and 5). The β parameter can
be conceptualized as an indication of item difficulty, meaning that higher β values
reflect that higher levels of the latent trait is required for item endorsement (Morizot
et al., 2009).
The GRM model rests on a number of assumptions that are beyond the scope of
this thesis (but see e.g., de Ayala, 2013), but one assumption deserves attention as it
directly relates to the topic of this thesis: the problem of dimensionality, or the prob-
lem of how many factors to extract, which is a fundamental problem in latent variable
models. It also a fundamental problem in this dissertation, as psychopathy is theo-
retically one dimension and Machiavellianism a second dimension. The question of
what number of factors to extract is a difficult one; it has been discussed for a long
time (e.g., Cattell, 1966; Kaiser, 1960), and multiple factor retention methods have
been developed, including the scree method (Cattell, 1966), parallel analysis (Horn,
1965), the Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960), minimum average partial (Velicer, 1976),
and more recently exploratory graph analysis (Golino & Epskamp, 2017). With the
4 α should not be confused with Cronbach’s alpha, which is an internal consistency coefficient. Sim-
ilarly, β should not be confused with standardized regression coefficients.
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exception of exploratory graph analysis, details about these common extraction meth-
ods can be found in Timmerman, Lorenzo-Seva, and Ceulemans (2018). The issue
of dimensionality is revisited in a subsequent section.
4.1.2 Fit Indices
The point of fitting data to a latent variable model, as we have seen, is to ob-
tain estimates of model parameters (e.g., factor loadings) in order to produce
a variance-covariance matrix (usually denoted Σ) which reproduces the sample
variance-covariance matrix (usually denoted S) as closely as possible (Brown, 2015,
pp. 62–67). Exactly how this is done is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the cru-
cial principle is to estimate model parameters (ordinarily using maximum likelihood)
given some sample, such that the model parameters are maximally likely to be re-
produced in new data from the same population (Brown, 2015). A large number
of statistical indices exist for determining how well the original data and implied
model correspond, for instance the χ2 (see e.g., Brown, 2015), root mean square error
of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990), standardized root mean square residual
(SRMR; Hu & Bentler, 1999). Tucker–Lewis index (TLI; Tucker & Lewis, 1973),
and comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990). A few general notes on these indices
are provided next.
The χ2-test is a statistical test used to test goodness-of-fit. Specifically, it can be
used to test whether there is any departure between the covariances predicted by the
model, given the parameter estimates, and the population covariance matrix. This
test is conducted using a typical null-hypothesis significance testing framework, such
that a model may be rejected based on a given p-value. For a variety of reasons, the
χ2-test is almost always reported, but rarely used for decisions in applied research.
One of its more pervasive problems is that it is highly sensitive to sample size, which
means that when N is small, the underlying distribution will likely not follow the
χ2-distribution. Conversely, if the sample size is large, the χ2-test is almost always
significant, because the hypothesis that S = Σ is very strict (Brown, 2015; but see also
Ropovik, 2015).
There are also so-called approximate fit indices (e.g., RMSEA, SRMR, CFI,
TLI), which do not necessarily rely on exact statistical tests, but are instead contin-
uous measures of the correspondence between data and model (i.e., whether S = Σ).
These tests can be divided further into different classes, such as absolute, incremen-
tal, parsimony-adjusted, and predictive fit indices (Kline, 2016, pp. 265–267). The
nuances among these categories are not important for the present purposes. More
important are the traditional model fit guidelines (Hu & Bentler, 1999), although
strict adherence to those guidelines by no means guarantee correctly specified mod-
els (Ropovik, 2015). Under maximum likelihood estimation, Hu and Bentler (1999)
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recommended that RMSEA should be close to ≤ .06, SRMR should be close to ≤
.08, and both TLI andCFI should be close to≥ .95. There has been a lot of discussion
regarding these guidelines, and Hu and Bentler (1999) were very careful with point-
ing out that guidelines should not be turned into laws that replace thinking. They
also offered rather complex combinatorial rules for joint use of indices. Model fit is
further complicated as a function of reliability (McNeish, An, & Hancock, 2018).
4.1.3 Dimensionality and Statistical Indices for BifactorModels
The bifactor model recently regained its popularity after a long hiatus (Markon, 2019;
Reise, 2012). The bifactor model specifies a general factor on which all indicator vari-
ables load, and a number of specific factors onto which construct specific indicators
load. This process allows researchers to decompose variance from a general factor
(e.g., a general DT core) and orthogonal specific factors (e.g., Machiavellianism, nar-
cissism, and psychopathy). The bifactor model is not unproblematic (Eid, Geiser,
Koch, & Heene, 2017). One issue is that bifactor models are known to overfit data,
meaning that they are flexible enough to display superior fit because of accommo-
dation of implausible response patterns regardless of population structure (Bonifay,
Lane, & Reise, 2017; Markon, 2019). Thus, it may be good advice to start with
testing a bifactor structure and subsequently move on to more restrictive models.
The bifactor model is, however, very appropriate for partitioning, or decompos-
ing, different sources of variance. This is particularly relevant for DT research, as
partialling has been raised as a substantial issue due to the highly correlated nature of
DT constructs (Lynam, Hoyle, & Newman, 2006; Sleep, Lynam, Hyatt, & Miller,
2017b). The problem of partialling is knowing what a (residualized) construct means
once variance from another, related construct, has been removed from the original. In
the bifactor case, what does the specific factors represent once the general factor has
been accounted for? Theoretically, this leads to the problem of what Machiavellian-
ism means once variance in psychopathy has been partialled from the construct? This
issue is by no means limited to bifactor models, but the bifactor model is a particu-
larly clear example of when partialling variance is an explicit goal for the researcher.
Accordingly, this feature is both a strength and a weakness. One reason for the recent
increase in popularity of bifactor models is the possibility of calculating a number of
statistical indices that help researchers understand a given construct’s structure and
utility. These indices have been described at length elsewhere (Rodriguez, Reise, &
Haviland, 2016a, 2016b), but brief notes on each will be provided subsequently.
The traditional route in test construction and development is for researchers to
calculate Cronbach’s α (1951) for a set of items. If α is sufficiently high, the scale
is likely deemed ”internally consistent”, ”unidimensional” or perhaps ”reliable”; pu-
tatively suggesting that the measure reflects the construct it is purported to measure
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with minimal error variance. There are, however, a number of issues with such termi-
nology (Sijtsma, 2009), and with taking this route in general, including specific issues
with α. These issues are intricate and psychometrically complex (see e.g., Dunn, Bag-
uley, & Brunsden, 2014; McNeish, 2018; Sijtsma, 2009; Zinbarg, Revelle, Yovel, &
Li, 2005), and will thus only be briefly elaborated on here. Cronbach’s α rests on a
set of rather rigid statistical assumptions that are unlikely to be met in practice. One
of them is tau equivalence, which entails that all items contribute equally to the total
score. Another is that errors between items are assumed to be uncorrelated, which
means that item responses cannot be related to one another if not caused by the con-
struct being measured. Cronbach’s α also assumes unidimensionality, which is the
degree to which items measure the same construct.5
Fortunately, there are many alternatives to α, one of which is coefficient omega
(ω) and its derivatives, which relaxes these assumptions. ω is a factor analytic model-
based reliability estimate, typically estimated using standardized factor loadings. Im-
portantly,ω is a composite based reliability estimate, which means that the reliability
of a unit-weighted (i.e., added up raw scores that constitute a scale score) composite
can be estimated. The most important difference between α andω is, for the present
purposes, that ω indices can be used to better understand subscale reliability. Cron-
bach’s α does not easily allow for partition of variance from a general factor, and thus
subscale αs can be highly exaggerated. This distinction will become more evident in
the coming pages. For more details about the intricacies of α andω, the reader is di-
rected to other sources (Dunn et al., 2014; Hoekstra, Vugteveen,Warrens, &Kruyen,
2018; McNeish, 2018; Rodriguez et al., 2016b).
In a bifactor structure, ω can be calculated using the matrix of standardized fac-
tor loadings. Specifically, it is calculated by placing the general and specific factors
in the numerator, and the general and specific factors plus unique variance in the
denominator:
ω =
(∑λ𝑔)2 + (∑λ𝑠1)2 + (∑λ𝑠2)2 + (∑λ𝑠𝑛)
2
(∑λ𝑔)2 + (∑λ𝑠1)2 + (∑λ𝑠2)2 + (∑λ𝑠𝑛)2 +∑(1 − ℎ2)
(4.1)
In the case of the 27 item (9 items per scale) SD3 (Jones & Paulhus, 2014), the
equation becomes
5 Unidimensionality and internal consistency are difficult concepts to disentangle. The interested
reader is directed to McNeish (2018) and references therein.
4.1. Latent Variable Models 53
ωSD3 =
(∑27𝑖=1 λDT)2 + (∑
9
𝑖=1 λMach)2 + (∑
18
𝑖=10 λNarc)2
(∑27𝑖=1 λDT)2 + (∑
9
𝑖=1 λMach)2 + (∑
18
𝑖=10 λNarc)2
+
(∑27𝑖=19 λPsych)2
(∑27𝑖=19 λPsych)2 +∑
27
𝑖=1(1 − ℎ2𝑖 )
(4.2)
The ω indices have the added benefit of being extendable to only the general
factor, in which case it’s known as omega hierarchical (ωH) or only the specific factors
(omega hierarchical subscaleωHS), in which case the general factor is partitioned out.
ωH is computed as:
ωH =
(∑λ𝑔)2
(∑λ𝑔)2 + (∑λ𝑠1)2 + (∑λ𝑠2)2 + (∑λ𝑠𝑛)2 +∑(1 − ℎ2)
(4.3)
ωH is informative insofar as it tells us how much of the reliable common variance
in a total score is attributable to the general factor. As a corollary, ωHS informs us
about how much reliable variance there is in a subscale after removal of general factor
variance:
ωHS =
(∑λ𝑠1)2
(∑λ𝑔)2 + (∑λ𝑠1)2 + (∑λ𝑠2)2 + (∑λ𝑠𝑛)2 +∑(1 − ℎ2)
(4.4)
Thus,ωHS reflects how much reliable variance there is in a subscale after partitioning
of variance from the general factor. This is different from calculating e.g. Cronbach’s
α for a subscale, in which case general factor variance is not partitioned out. By
extension, this means that many published findings on measures believed to be mul-
tidimensional in fact contain a large degree of general factor variance (Rodriguez et
al., 2016a). Together, the different ω indices inform about what sources of variance
contribute to total and subscale scores. There are, however, other bifactor-relevant
indices that help inform about to what extent data are unidimensional, to what ex-
tent a factor is likely to replicate, and the viability of using a factor in a SEM. These
indices are discussed subsequently.
One of the more pressing issues in FA is the fact that factor scores are indetermi-
nate (Grice, 2001), meaning that an infinite number of factor scores that are equally
consistent with the factor solution can be computed. Thus, two researchers can use
different methods and arrive at negatively correlated factor scores based on the same
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data. The degree to which the factor scores are determinate can be estimated, and en-
ables the researcher to confidently ”assume that individual differences on the factor
score estimates are good representations of true individual differences on the factor”
(Rodriguez et al., 2016b, p. 142). One approach to computing factor determinacy
has been provided by Beauducel (2011):
FD = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(ΦΛTΣ−1ΛΦ)1/2 (4.5)
where Φ is a matrix of factor intercorrelations, which in the bifactor model will al-
ways be an identity matrix (i.e., ones on the diagonal) because the bifactor model
is orthogonal. Λ is a k × m matrix of standardized factor loadings, where k is the
number of factors, and m is the number of items. Finally, Σ is a k × kmatrix contain-
ing the model implied correlation matrix. FD is recommended to be .90 or greater
(Rodriguez et al., 2016b).
Importantly, FD is only relevant when factor scores are extracted. When speci-
fying a SEM, the degree to which the indicators represent the latent variable is more
relevant. Assessing the quality of the indicators can be done using Hancock and
Mueller’s (2001) H :
H = 1/
⎡
⎢⎢
⎣
1 + 1
∑𝑘𝑖=1
λ2𝑖
1−λ2𝑖
⎤
⎥⎥
⎦
(4.6)
where λ refers to standardized factor loadings. H can be calculated for each factor. It
can be thought of as a quality index which indicates how likely a latent variable is to be
stable across studies, and thus how appropriate it would be to specify a latent variable
using the specific set of indicators under study (cf. Rodriguez et al., 2016b). Hancock
and Mueller (2001) suggested .70 as a lower criterion for H. Thus, for models where
H ≤ .70, confidence in estimated path coefficients should be more modest.
Another index, Explained Common Variance (ECV ; Ten Berge & Sočan, 2004),
is used for assessing the degree of multidimensionality, or in the bifactor case, the
relative strength of the general to specific factors. ECV is computed accordingly:
ECV =
(∑λ2𝑔)
(∑λ2𝑔) + (∑λ2𝑠1) + (∑λ2𝑠2) + (∑λ2𝑠𝑛)
(4.7)
where λ are standardized factor loadings. The computed value is standardized be-
tween 0 and 1 and indicates howmany percent of the common variance is attributable
to the general factor. A value of .70 thus indicates that 70% variance is explained by
the general factor, and 30% by the specific factors. ECV can also be extended to the
item level, in which case it is referred to as Item Explained Common Variance (I-
ECV ). Stucky and Edelen (2014) proposed that the I-ECV could be used to create
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so-called ”essentially unidimensional”6 scales in order to create ”pure” measures of a
specific construct (cf. McGrath, 2005).
4.2 Online Data Collection
In order to successfully use multivariate models, a large number of participants are
generally required (e.g., Hirschfeld, von Brachel, & Thielsch, 2014). With this in
mind, participants were recruited usingMTurk. MTurk enables individuals and busi-
nesses to request so-called Human Intelligence Tasks against an amount of money.
In this case, the collection of psychological data from relatively large samples of peo-
ple. Plenty of concerns have been raised regarding the utility of MTurk, including
whether the respondents provide a good representation of the population. This issue
will soon be discussed, but first keep in mind that psychology, as an entire field, has
been called into question for essentially providing a description of ”WEIRD” people.
That is, Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic, which is hardly
representative of the world in general (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). It
has been suggested that crowdsourcing alternatives, such as MTurk, can be valuable
assets in providing non-WEIRD samples (Gosling, Sandy, John, & Potter, 2010).
Concerns have been raised regarding the crowdsourcing methodology. For in-
stance, whether MTurk participants differ significantly from the general population,
whether unreliable and invalid data is produced, and whether MTurk workers are in-
sufficiently attentive to the task at hand. Regarding the latter issue, it is common for
researchers to exclude participants on the basis of inattentiveness (usually measured
by a failure to correctly answer obvious questions). This exclusion has also been cause
for concern, as it may potentially bias the post-exclusion sample. These concerns have
been thoroughly investigated and will be briefly reviewed.
Using data from the years 2012–2015, Stewart et al. (2015) estimated that the
pool of MTurk workers consisted of around 7,300 individuals, in any quarter year.
In each quarter year, 20% of the workers retire and new workers begin. MTurk pro-
vides more representative samples than typical lab studies (Casler, Bickel, & Hack-
ett, 2013). The test-retest reliability on psychometric inventories are similar to those
collected in the lab (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Shapiro, Chandler, &
Mueller, 2013). The prevalence of psychopathology is higher than in the general pop-
ulation (Shapiro et al., 2013). MTurk workers are more comfortable with disclosing
private information online, despite not being completely anonymous (Shapiro et al.,
6 The term ”essentially unidimensional” reflects the fact that it is very rare to see any measure being
completely unidimensional, but under certain conditions, multidimensional data can be fit to uni-
dimensional structures (the reliable variance in a factor is influenced primarily by a single source),
which is what essential unidimensionality refers to. This concept has been elaborated upon else-
where (e.g., Bonifay, Reise, Scheines, & Meijer, 2015; Ip, 2010; Reise, Moore, & Haviland, 2010).
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2013). Importantly, MTurk workers have been shown to provide reliable informa-
tion (Rand, 2012; Shapiro et al., 2013). Using multiple screening questions has been
recommended, in order to make sure that workers pay attention (Berinsky, Margolis,
& Sances, 2014). Finally, MTurk has also been endorsed for research in the person-
ality disorder domain (Miller, Crowe, Weiss, Maples-Keller, & Lynam, 2017a). For
a review of the current state of MTurk research, see (Thomas & Clifford, 2017).
4.3 Ethics
Before delving into the details of the articles, a short note on ethics is in order. Psy-
chological experiments are full of potentially problematic aspects, but being that the
present studies are not experiments (i.e., no manipulation is present), there is far less
impact on the participants. Indeed, the main concern for the present studies was
making sure that participants freely participated after having been informed about
the study. In a few of the studies presented subsequently, I downloaded anonymous
data from online sources. Having no control over the collection of this data, my main
ethical concern was ensuring qualitative and trustworthy analysis. In cases where I
personally collected data, I ensured that all procedures were performed in accordance
with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and
with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical
standards (World Medical Association, 2013). All data is anonymous and will be
made available upon request.
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Chapter 5: Empirical Studies
5.1 Article I
Title: The (mis)measurement of the Dark Triad Dirty Dozen: Exploitation at the
core of the scale (Kajonius et al., 2016)
The DD (Jonason & Webster, 2010) has been previously validated (Jonason & Lué-
vano, 2013; Webster & Jonason, 2013), translated into a number of languages, and
been utilized in a large number of studies.1 However, it had also been subjected to
criticism for being too short, thus not providing a substantial amount of construct
validity (Maples et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2012a). Thus, replicating the factor struc-
ture using a large sample and examining the construct validity of the DD was a much
needed addition to the literature. In a sample of 3,698 participants, EFA, CFA,
and IRT were used to study the factor structure and item level characteristics of the
DD. The EFA showed considerable cross-correlation between factors, with multiple
salient loadings (i.e., >|.40|) across all three factors. Factor structures were, however,
highly similar in men and women. The CFA confirmed that a bifactor model could
reproduce the data with excellent model fit (normed fit index = .98, RMSEA = .05).
The IRT analysis showed that two items contributed most information toward
the total score. These items were exploitation (”I tend to exploit others towards my
own end”) and manipulation (”I tend to manipulate others to get my way”), and had
α values of 3.33 and 2.73, respectively. Both of these items theoretically belong to
the Machiavellianism subscale. With that said, the freely estimated loadings (i.e.,
in the EFA) for the item exploitation were .78, .60, and 36, for Machiavellianism,
psychopathy, and narcissism. The manipulation item’s loadings were .81, .54, and
.34.2 These two particular items also had the highest general factor loading in the
bifactor CFA.These itemswere also quite highly skewed, such that individuals needed
θ values between 0 and 2.5 for the items to be informative. This pattern was found in
the total score as well, indicating that the DD provides information only for relatively
high endorsement rates on the DT traits. This is to say that low scores on the DD
are unreliable, and that their meaning is thus cast in more uncertainty.
1 As of 2018-10-22, Jonason and Webster (2010) has been cited 631 times on Google Scholar.
2 The loadings were similar in men and women. The loadings reported here are from the male sample.
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Although not reported in the published paper, the bifactor-relevant indices can
be computed and provide valuable information. For the general factor, Machiavel-
lianism, narcissism, and psychopathy, respectively, the indices were: FD = .94, .70,
.81, .89, H = .89, .33, .59, .77, ECV = .56, ω = .91, and ωH/HS = .73, .07, .36, .59.
This indicates that full scale reliability is high, as indicated by ω.3 If one estimates
factor scores, those scores can be said to be reliable in the general factor case, and
perhaps for psychopathy (the traditional recommendation is ≥ .90 Gorsuch, 1983),
but not for Machiavellianism and narcissism. Construct replicability, as indexed by
Hancock’s H shows the same pattern, as the recommendation is ≥ .70, which nei-
ther Machiavellianism or narcissism meets. This suggests that these two variables are
not well-defined by their respective indicators. Regarding dimensionality, the ECV
was .56, which means that 56% of the variance was explained by the general factor,
and 44% by the other three factors. This is not particularly high, although as far as
I know, there are no published recommendations for ECV yet. This indicates that if
a unidimensional model was fit to the data, one could expect the loading patterns to
be quite different from those of the general factor. This would not be the case if ECV
is very high. Finally, ωH/HS indicated that a lot of the variance in the total score is
accounted for by the general factors, and also to some extent by the psychopathy sub-
scale. Comparing ωH with ω, we get .73/.91 = .80, which means that 80% of the
reliable variance in the total score is attributable to the general factor.
This study made three important additions to the literature. First, it was one of
the first studies reintroducing the suggestion (McHoskey et al., 1998) that Machi-
avellianism and psychopathy could be jointly modeled as one factor (cf. Glenn &
Sellbom, 2015). A second and related point of discussion, is that narcissism deviates
more from psychopathy andMachiavellianism than the latter two do with each other.
This relative independence could be caused by many different factors, one suggestion
is that narcissism may be more socially acceptable, insofar as it is not as socially unde-
sirable.4 Third, the notion that Machiavellianism is a less severe form of psychopathy
was tested, albeit in a limited way, by illustrating bimodal frequency distributions in
the DD. Specifically, item endorsement rates were much lower for narcissism than
Machiavellianism and psychopathy, and psychopathy items were much less endorsed
than Machiavellianism items. This could indicate that Machiavellianism is a less se-
vere form of psychopathy and that although the two constructs can be modeled to-
gether, the constructs may have differing meaning across the latent trait (cf. Tay &
Jebb, 2018). This idea is investigated in more detail for the SD3 in Article III.
3 These numbers are all lower than those reported in Rodriguez et al. (2016a), who also provide a
solid background on all of these indices (cf. Rodriguez et al., 2016b).
4 An example narcissism item in the DD is ”I tend to want others to admire me” compared with Machi-
avellianism ”I tend to exploit others towards my own end”, and psychopathy ”I tend to be callous or
insensitive”.
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5.2 Article II
Title: Revisiting the structure of the Short Dark Triad (Persson et al., 2019)
In 2014, Jones and Paulhus created the SD3 and validated it across four different stud-
ies in a total of 1,063 participants. The SD3 was created in part as a reaction to the
lackluster validity of the DD (Miller et al., 2012a) and also to reduce the large number
of items needed to capture all three DT constructs. Jones and Paulhus (2014) were
able to produce a 27 item inventory through the use of EFA and ESEM.The authors
further showed reasonable internal consistency estimates (Cronbach’s α), concurrent
validity coefficients, and observer ratings. The SD3 quickly became popular and used
in a great number of studies (the SD3 has now been cited almost 500 times, approx-
imately four years after its publication). Despite this popularity, no one attempted a
replication of the factor structure of the SD3. Neither did anyone attempt to model it
using CFA, which was troubling given that Jones and Paulhus (2014) reported rather
poor CFA model fit and further did not report factor loadings, or any other details
about these analyses. Accordingly, Article II was rooted in the idea that the SD3
needed to be both replicated and more formally tested using stricter models. These
tests were conducted across three different studies.
5.2.1 Study I
The study was conducted using a sample of 1,487 participants (nmen = 608, nwomen =
879) recruited via MTurk. Initial analyses showed similar results to those expected
from Jones and Paulhus (2014). The analyses were conducted so as to map as closely
as possible onto the initial study (Jones & Paulhus, 2014). This included using EFA
with oblique (promax) rotation. Solutions ranging between 2–7 factors all showed
relatively poor model fit; the best one being the seven factor model (χ2 = 474.523, df
= 183, TLI = .921, RMSEA = .044). Although not reported in the published study,
Tucker’s Congruence Coefficient (TCC, or ϕ), which is a measure of similarity be-
tween factor solutions (Lorenzo-Seva&Ten Berge, 2006), is suitable for determining
the degree to which the factor structure was replicated. TCC is computed as
ϕ(𝑥, 𝑦) = ∑𝑥𝑖𝑦𝑖
√∑𝑥2𝑖 ∑𝑦2𝑖
(5.1)
where xi and yi are factor loadings for each variable i on factors x and y, respectively.
In this case, the vectors are pattern coefficients for the respective DT constructs. Val-
ues indicating good factorial similarity are usually considered >.95 (Lorenzo-Seva &
Ten Berge, 2006). In this case, the TCC indicated fair, but below recommended
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Table 5.1
EFA Based Tucker Congruence Coefficients for the SD3 in Study 1
Machiavellianism Narcissism Psychopathy
Machiavellianism .81 -.01 .47
Narcissism .20 .87 .07
Psychopathy .45 .06 .76
Note. Coefficients were not reported in original study. See Lorenzo-Seva and Ten
Berge (2006) for information about Tucker’s Congruence Coefficients.
thresholds (cf. Table 5.1). The relatively poor TCC could be a consequence of sam-
ple size, as EFA factor loadings are known to sometimes require more than 1,000
participants before they stabilize (Hirschfeld et al., 2014).
In addition to this analysis, an exploratory bifactor analysis was conducted in or-
der to determine general factor saturation. This is particularly important for the DT,
as the justification for the utility of these three constructs are predicated on both their
convergent and discriminant validity. Modelling a general factor may thus illumi-
nate the extent to which all items are saturated by a common theme. Surprisingly,
this analysis generated an empty specific factor, meaning that there were no load-
ings larger than .05 on the specific psychopathy factor. The Machiavellianism items
showed disparate loadings, while the narcissism items clustered relatively well to-
gether on their own factor. I learned subsequently that empty specific factors are not
altogether uncommon (Eid et al., 2017). In any case, the ECV was .62, suggesting
that 62% of the variance was accounted for by the general factor. Furthermore, as
noted in the publication ”the mean I-ECV for all items was .54, but a modest .21 for
narcissism, .63 for Machiavellianism and .78 for psychopathy” (Persson et al., 2019,
p. 5). This suggests that the psychopathy items were most affected by the general fac-
tor, which could be interpreted in accordance with Glenn and Sellbom (2015), who
argued that DT inventories are mostly saturated by psychopathy. Crucially, being
that the narcissism items were the only ones that clustered relatively well together,
the question of whether Machiavellianism and psychopathy could be modelled to-
gether arose.
5.2.2 Study II
In Study II we set out to test five different, but tenable, models of the SD3, with
the addition of also testing the unidimensionality of each individual factor. This
was done using a sample of 17,740 participants (freely available from http://www.
personality-testing.info/_rawdata). The five prespecified models were: (A) a model
with all 27 items loading on one factor (i.e., unidimensional); (B) a correlated two-
factor model where psychopathy and Machiavellianism items were subsumed under
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one factor; (C) a correlated three-factor model; (D) a bifactor model with two spe-
cific factors following the same logic as Model 2; and (E) a bifactor model with three
specific factors. Thus, Models B and D were tests of the specific hypothesis that
Machiavellianism and psychopathy could be modelled together.
The model fit indices for the initial unidimensional models for each DT con-
struct were not very impressive. CFI and TLI were >.95 for all three factors, but
RMSEA values were .104, .079, and .095 for Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psy-
chopathy, respectively. Given that each construct only consists of 9 items (model df
= 27), almost perfect model fit is desired, if perhaps not expected. Subsequently to
publication, it was learnt that there is a complex relation between model fit and reli-
ability (McNeish et al., 2018). If standardized loadings are very high (λ ≈ .90), an
RMSEA of .20 can be acceptable, while the converse relation also holds. With low
standardized loadings (λ ≈ .40), significant model misfit can be present even with
very low RMSEA (<.06). In the unidimensional models, mean standardized load-
ings were .70, .60, and .60, for Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy. The
lower means for the latter two is due to several reversed items, which are not present
in the Machiavellianism scale.
Models A–E fit the data surprisingly well, though the RMSEA values were some-
what large (≈ .080 – .100). When studying the residuals, it was evident that thismisfit
was, at least in part, caused by local strain within each construct, which was also evi-
dent in the previously tested unidimensional models. Importantly, Model D fit better
than Model E, suggesting that Machiavellianism and psychopathy could indeed be
modelled together. Additionally, the latent variable correlation between Machiavel-
lianism and psychopathy was .90 in Model C, which is tantamount to unity (Brown,
2015). In both Models D and E, narcissism showed substantially higher specific fac-
tor loadings than did Machiavellianism and psychopathy, thus suggesting that it was
more independent of the general factor. In fact, that this was so was tested more
formally using ECV, I-ECV, and ω indices. Results from both Model D and E
across all three studies are presented in Table 5.2. On the surface, these results seem
to suggest that there is a relatively strong general factor. However, upon close in-
spection it is clear that general factor saturation is an artefact, which de facto means
that Machiavellianism and psychopathy can be subsumed onto one factor that makes
the general factor appear relatively prominent. In other words, Machiavellianism and
psychopathy cluster together muchmore closely than does narcissism, suggesting that
the former two can possibly be modelled together as a single construct.
5.2.3 Study III
In Study III, a smallerMTurk sample (N = 496) was used, mainly for replication. But
in addition to replicating the CFAmodels from Study II, factor scores were extracted
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from Models D and E and compared to extant measures of the DT. Specifically, the
Mach-IV (Christie &Geis, 1970), a 16 item version of the NPI (Ames, Rose, & An-
derson, 2006), the psychoticism scale from the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire–
Revised Short Form (EPQR-S; Eysenck et al., 1985), and the DD scales (Jonason &
Webster, 2010). Convergent validity coefficients (i.e., zero-order correlations) were
such that the general factor always yielded the higher convergent correlations than
specific factors, with the sole exception of the NPI, which had greater convergence
with the specific narcissism factor. These results confirmed that narcissism splits from
Machiavellianism and psychopathy into its own factor, and consequently that the gen-
eral factor provides more reliable variance (i.e., higher convergent validity coefficients)
for external Machiavellianism and psychopathy correlates.
Although not reported in the publication, it was also possible to estimate CFA
models across all three samples and thus to determine the stability of factor solutions
using the TCC (see Equation 5.1). For Model E, ϕ was ≥ .96 for the general factor,
Machiavellianism, and narcissism across all three samples. Psychopathy had values
of .90, .94, and .87, in the three respective studies, suggesting that psychopathy did
not replicate as well as the other three latent variables. In conclusion, it seems that
Machiavellianism and psychopathy are not distinct constructs and are more appro-
priate to model together than apart. These results are, however, limited to SD3.
In a similar study McLarnon and Tarraf (2017) used ESEM to both the DD and
SD3. The authors were able to show that ESEM bi-factor models provided good
fit to the data, especially to the DD inventory. Although ESEM does not force all
non-target items to zero (which CFA does) a similar factor loading pattern was ob-
served for the SD3. General and specific factor reliability indices were also similar to
previously reported results: ωH/HS = .66, .16, .35, .16, for the general factor, Machi-
avellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy, respectively.5 This suggests that although
a less rigorous (and thus better fitting) model was fit to the data, a similar pattern of
results emerged.
5 These indices were not reported in the original publication but computed based on the factor loading
matrix reported as supplementary information (McLarnon & Tarraf, 2017). Whether ω indices
are applicable to ESEMmodels is questionable given that non-target loadings are non-zero. In this
case,ω indices were computed on the basis of all loadings across all factors, not just target loadings.
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Table 5.2
Summary of Bifactor Model Indices for all Three Studies
Two Factor Model (i.e., Model D)
Study I Study II Study III
Index DT MP N DT MP N DT MP N
FD .94 .75 .83 .96 .76 .82 .95 .72 .72
H .88 .52 .69 .93 .52 .66 .93 .50 .51
ECV .65 0 0 .75 0 0 .70 0 0
ω .87 0 0 .92 0 0 .92 0 0
ωH/HS .75 .01 59 .86 .01 .42 .81 .13 .18
Three Factor Model (i.e., Model E)
Study I Study II Study III
Index DT M N P DT M N P DT M N P
FD .93 .72 .83 .70 .95 .72 .82 .72 .93 .70 .87 .71
H .88 .53 .69 .50 .93 .50 .67 .51 .89 .50 .76 .51
ECV .58 0 0 0 .70 0 0 0 .58 0 0 0
ω .87 0 0 0 .92 0 0 0 .89 0 0 0
ωH/HS .69 .19 .58 .21 .81 .13 .43 .18 .71 .16 .62 .21
Note. DT = Dark Triad, M = Machiavellianism, N = Narcissism, P = Psychopathy, MP = Machiavellianism and psy-
chopathy subsumed in one factor. See main text for description of indices. Zeroes are present because ECV andω are
not applicable to subscales.
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5.3 Article III
Title: Testing construct independence in the Short Dark Triad using item response
theory (Persson et al., 2017)
McHoskey et al. (1998) took note of the fact that Machiavellianism and psychopathy
are highly similar constructs. Having carried out a number of analyses, they argued
that ”the vast literature on [Machiavellianism] can be interpreted as an explication
of the dispositions and interpersonal tendencies of relatively successful yet antisocial
people” (p. 207). Thus, the arguments that Machiavellianism and psychopathy are
mostly the same, and that Machiavellianism may be better conceptualized as be a less
severe variant of psychopathy, were spawned.
Article III focused on two ideas: previous findings were extended by the use of
IRT and we tested the notion that Machiavellianism may be a less severe form av
psychopathy. Samples from Studies 1 and 3 (Persson et al., 2019) were pooled, for a
total N of 1,983 MTurk participants. A total of seven IRT models were estimated:
one for each SD3 scale, three models where two constructs were subsumed in the
same model (i.e., M + P, M + N, and N + P), and finally a model for the entire SD3.
As in the previous article, the models showed that Machiavellianism and psy-
chopathy are indeed more easily modeled together in one model, than if narcissism is
included. This was indicated by the fit indices, which dropped dramatically in mod-
els where narcissism was included. This result provides more evidence that items
measuring the constructs Machiavellianism and psychopathy are essentially indistin-
guishable from the perspective of dimensionality (i.e., the items measure the same
phenomenon).
Second, the results also indicate that items measuring the domain of Machiavel-
lianism are indeed more frequently endorsed than are psychopathy items (see Figure
5.1). Indeed, the mean values for β1 was -2.19 for Machiavellianism and -0.09 for
psychopathy, indicating that there was more than two standard deviations difference
in the latent trait (i.e., θ) required for the first response option. This trend was close to
linear for the first three β-values, but the mean value was dramatically larger for β4.
This suggests that when moving up on the latent trait continuum, item locations be-
come more similar for Machiavellianism and psychopathy.6 This can be interpreted
in a number of ways. First, it could indicate that Machiavellianism is a less severe
form of psychopathy, although both constructs belong on the same latent dimension.
It could also be interpreted as if the two constructs become more similar at a higher
6 The reported pattern was highly similar when Machiavellianism and psychopathy were combined
in one model. Mean values for β1-4 (split models reported before slash) were: β1 = -2.60/-2.18,
β2 = -1.21/-0.98, β3 = 0.17/0.23, β4 = 2.62/2.38 for Machiavellianism; and β1 = -0.19/-0.09, β2 =
1.38/1.23, β3 = 2.28/2.03, β4 = 3.87/3.37 for psychopathy.
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Figure 5.1. Mean values for each location parameter (i.e., β1–
β4) for each SD3 domain.
θ, thus implying less similarity at lower levels. The meaning of scores across the con-
struct continuum is one of several issues in construct specification (Tay& Jebb, 2018).
Whether low scores on any of the DT constructs simply reflect absence of such traits,
or the opposite (e.g., altruism, compassion), is unknown. It is important to note that
this hypothesis was not tested with reference to external variables. Indeed, it would
be interesting to (a) test if the same response pattern would hold in other inventories;
and (b) whetherMachiavellianism and psychopathy produce differential external cor-
relations across the latent trait continuum. One way of doing this would be to use an
extreme group design (Preacher, Rucker, MacCallum, & Nicewander, 2005) where
extremely low and extremely high scorers on both constructs were compared against
relevant outcomes. Such a study has not been conducted as of yet. A further possibil-
ity would be to apply non-parametric or ideal point IRT models, but the intricacies
of such approaches is beyond the scope of the present thesis.
5.4 Article IV
Title: Searching for Machiavelli but finding psychopathy and narcissism (Persson,
2019b)
The three articles presented hitherto have all focused on theDD and SD3, but conclu-
sions about Machiavellianism, in its entirety, are necessarily limited when analyzing
only those two relatively short inventories. Accordingly, in Article IV, I collected
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data on 7 different Machiavellianism scales (15 measures in total), for a total of 65
items tapping the Machiavellianism domain. The inventories putatively measuring
Machiavellianism were the DD (Jonason & Webster, 2010), SD3 (Jones & Paul-
hus, 2014), Mach-IV (Christie & Geis, 1970), Mach-VI (Paulhus & Jones, 2015),
the scales deceitfulness and manipulativeness from the The Personality Inventory for
DSM-5 (PID-5; Krueger et al., 2012), and six items from the International Person-
ality Item Pool (IPIP) representation of the Jackson Personality Inventory ( JPI-R
Jackson, 1994) measuring social boldness. These inventories were collected in a sam-
ple of 591 MTurk participants.
I used Goldberg’s (2006) Bass-Ackwards approach, which is a method of iter-
atively extracting (principal) components from a data set in order to analyze its hi-
erarchical structure. This means that each iteratively extracted component can be
compared with preceding components (i.e., Level 3 components with Level 2 com-
ponents). In this case, the hierarchical structure of Machiavellianism was investi-
gated. The fundamental premise of the study was that multiple studies had shown
that measures of Machiavellianism failed to generate results one would expect. These
studies had one of two problems in common: They either (a) were conducted on facet
level variables (not taking item information into account) or (b) they were limited to
a small set of items. Thus, using a large item pool of Machiavellianism items ensured
that both conditions (a) and (b) were satisfied. In the best case scenario, the Bass-
Ackwards approach could illuminate nuances within the construct hierarchy that had
previously gone undetected.
I extracted four components and compared them to prototype descriptions of the
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Figure 5.2. Hierarchical representation of the Bass-Ackwards
structure extracted fromMachiavellianism items. FUPC = First
unrotated principal component. Coefficients smaller than .40
have been omitted for ease of presentation.
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respective DT constructs. The relations among the different levels of the construct
hierarchy are presented in Figure 5.2. The prototype comparison analysis was possible
because expert rated FFM prototype profiles have been published in extant literature
(for Machiavellianism, see; Miller et al., 2017b; for narcissism, see; Lynam &Widi-
ger, 2001; and for psychopathy, see; Miller, Lyman, Widiger, & Leukefeld, 2001).
Thus, by calculating correlations between each extracted component and IPIP-NEO
facets, the relative similarity7 (which is computed as a simple Pearson correlation) be-
tween each component and expert rated prototypes could be computed. In this case,
the relative similarity indicates which component is most similar to prototype de-
scriptions of the respective DT constructs. If a particular component is more closely
related to Machiavellianism than the other two constructs, that could serve as a fur-
ther foundation for understanding why that is. However, if the opposite results are
received, it suggests that even measure of Machiavellianism do not seem to contain
information particularly relevant to the Machiavellianism construct, as rated by ex-
perts. Four components were retained using the Bass-Ackward analysis.
Every component at each level was correlated with the IPIP-NEO facets and
domains, and subsequently compared with prototype profiles (i.e., those reported in
Table 3.4). The profile similarities between components and expert prototypes are re-
ported in Table 5.3. The extracted content from measures of Machiavellianism were
less related to theMachiavellianism prototype than to both narcissism and psychopa-
thy prototypes. This result held true throughout the hierarchy, although the effects
differed on different levels (e.g., narcissism was more similar to the first unrotated
principal component).8
In addition to the analyses described above, I analyzed the extracted compo-
nent scores from the four component solution via hierarchical multiple regressions
against external measures in order to assess the incremental validity of measures of
Machiavellianism (these analyses are not part of the publication). These external mea-
sures were, in addition to the SD3 and DD, the Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry
Questionnaire Short Scale (NARQ-S; Leckelt et al., 2018), Narcissistic Personality
Inventory-13 (NPI-13; Gentile et al., 2013), Psychological Entitlement Scale (PES;
Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004), Hypersensitive Narcissism
Scale (HSNS; Fossati et al., 2009), Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Em-
mons, Larsen, &Griffin, 1985), the impulsivity facet from the PID-5 (Krueger et al.,
7 Computation of profile similarity is a rather complex issue, in particular with regards to absolute
similarity (McCrae, 1993, 2008; Wood & Furr, 2016).
8 A reviewer commented that this result may be an artefact caused by orthogonal rotation (varimax),
which is the recommended procedure (Goldberg, 2006). Oblique rotation (promax and oblimin) –
i.e. rotation that allows factor intercorrelation – did not change profile similarity results significantly,
although specific correlations between facets and components differed, sometimes radically, between
factor solutions. This change is, however, merely caused by the different weighting schemes em-
ployed by different rotation algorithms. The fact that the relative similarity was consistently higher
for psychopathy and narcissism did not change.
68 Chapter 5. Empirical Studies
Table 5.3
Correlations between Components and Expert Prototypes
Profile Similarities Machiavellianism Narcissism Psychopathy
FUPC .31 .60 .56
2.1: Exploitation .47 .73 .79
2.2: Manipulation .03 .22 .11
3.1: Exploitation .47 .72 .79
3.2: Cynicism .09 .22 .06
3.3: Dishonesty .01 .23 .18
4.1: Exploitation .49 .71 .80
4.2. Selfishness .14 .39 .30
4.3: Dishonesty .00 .21 .15
4.4: Cynicism .05 .05 -.13
Note. FUPC = First unrotated principal component. Profile similarities are Pearson
correlations between expert prototypes and components. The expert rated prototypes
are taken from the extant literature (Machiavellianism;Miller, Hyatt, Maples-Keller,
Carter, & Lynam, 2017b; narcissism; Lynam & Widiger, 2001; and psychopathy;
Miller, Lyman, Widiger, & Leukefeld, 2001).
2012), the domains Boldness, Meanness, and Disinhibition from the Triarchic Psy-
chopathy Measure (TriPM; Somma, Borroni, Drislane, Patrick, & Fossati, 2018),
and Levels of Personality Functioning Scale-Self Report (LPFS; Morey, 2017). Put
briefly, the NARQ-S is a measure of grandiose narcissism, or more specifically the di-
mensions admiration and rivalry. These two dimensions theoretically reflect agentic
aspects driven by self-enhancement (i.e., admiration) and antagonistic aspects driven
by self-defense (i.e., rivalry). The NPI-13 is a short measure of grandiose narcissism.
The PES measures entitlement, which has been theorized to be the central compo-
nent in narcissism, connecting grandiose and vulnerable features (Krizan&Herlache,
2018). The HSNS measures hypersensitive, or vulnerable, narcissism. SWLS is a
five-item measure of subjective well-being, or a global cognitive judgment of satis-
faction with one’s own life. This was included because the SWLS has been used in
the prediction of both healthy and unhealthy behaviors, and because it could poten-
tially inform about the affective components in Machiavellianism, narcissism, and
psychopathy (recall that Machiavellianism and psychopathy are substantially differ-
ent in trait depression, cf. Table 3.4). The impulsivity facet of PID-5 was included
becauseMachiavellianism and psychopathy are theoretically very different in terms of
impulsivity. The TriPM serves as a global measure of psychopathy. Boldness refers to
high dominance and low anxiousness and thus could reflect so-called “successful” fea-
tures of psychopathy (cf. Persson & Lilienfeld, 2019). Meanness reflects callousness
and cruelty and disinhibition reflects impulsivity and failures in taking responsibility
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(Patrick et al., 2009). Finally, the LPFS is intended to measure personality dysfunc-
tion (i.e., Criterion A) in the alternative model of personality disorders (Widiger et
al., 2018c).
Results from the regressions are presented in Table 5.4. In this analysis, I first
added all FFM factors in Step 1, HEXACO–A and HH as a second step, and finally
the component scores from the fourth level of the Bass-Ackwards analysis in Step
3. Together, these analyses illuminate, on the one hand, whether HEXACO adds
meaningful variance beyond the FFM and on the other hand, whether Machiavel-
lianism adds information beyond both of these previous steps. As expected, all FFM
factors generated well-known effects: agreeableness displayed strong relations with
multiple outcomes, most notably on DD psychopathy (β = -.58) and meanness (β =
-.54). Conscientiousness was mainly associated with impulsivity (βPID5−I𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦
= -.57) and disinhibition (β = -.40). Extraversion was associated with measures of
narcissism (e.g., βSD3N𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑚 = .39). Neuroticism was associated with vulnerable
narcissism (β = .42), negatively with boldness (β = -.49), and positively with per-
sonality dysfunction (βLPFS = .43). Finally, openness to experience was more or less
unrelated to all measures. HEXACO–A added relatively little variance beyond FFM
domains, with the largest effect on SD3 psychopathy (β = -.25).
In Step 2, HH proved to be a better predictor of narcissism than psychopathy,
especially grandiose features (βDDN𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑚 = -.74, βSD3N𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑚 = -.48, βNARQ−S
= -.53, βNPI−13 = -.54, βPES = -.51, βHSNS = -.24). Step 2 added between 9 and
21% explained variance (i.e., ΔR2-Adj) beyond Step 1 in grandiose narcissism-related
outcomes. It was not as promising for the other constructs (cf. Table 5.4). In Step
3, the components added an average of 3% explained variance (i.e., ΔR2-Adj) beyond
the previous steps. Because of this rather lackluster result, interpretation of individual
coefficients is difficult to justify. Taken together, these results suggest that the FFM
does a good job predicting a variety of outcomes (albeit these criteria are admittedly
biased insofar as they are mostly relevant for the DT). Because HH was particularly
relevant in the prediction of I also ran regression analyses using only agreeableness
and HH facets. These analyses were also partly predicated on the fact that previous
research has pointed out that HHmay be particularly well-suited (perhaps excessively
so) to predicting grandiose narcissism, as the HEXACO arguably contains elevated
or oversaturated content from modesty and straightforwardness (Miller, Gaughan,
Maples, & Price, 2011a). These analyses are presented in Table 5.5.
This second set of regression analyses expectedly show that some of the outcomes
were much more poorly predicted by excluding four out of five FFM factors. PID-5
Impulsivity, for instance, lost 20% explained variance when the other domains were
removed. Between the two steps, it became evident that HH facets modesty and
greed-avoidance were particularly good predictors of grandiose narcissism. It is dif-
ficult to draw strong conclusions based on this analysis, because the IPIP-NEO-120
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facet modesty contain a mere 4 items, while HH-modesty contains 10 items. Ex-
actly how much incremental validity one should reasonably be able to expect from
each added item is certainly debatable. In any case, these analyses tentatively sug-
gest that the IPIP-NEO-120 would be better able to predict grandiose narcissism
had additional items tapping modesty and greed-avoidance been included.
This study aligned with multiple previous studies in showing that measures of
Machiavellianism do not conform to theoretical descriptions, but instead show greater
overlap with psychopathy and in this case also narcissism. Throughout the construct
hierarchy prototypeMachiavellianism showed lesser overlap with thesemeasures than
did psychopathy and narcissism prototypes. Additionally, Machiavellianism added
relatively little variance beyond normal personality traits, which adds further reasons
to question its utility. The various inventories used for assessment of Machiavellian-
ism should be used with caution, as they show greater overlap with psychopathy and
narcissism than with the construct they are purported to measure. These findings are
discussed in more breadth and depth in the subsequent chapter.
5.4.
ArticleIV
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Table 5.4
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses showing Incremental Effects of Machiavellianism Items Beyond the Five Factor Model and IPIP-
HEXACO
Step 1 – FFM Step 2 – HEXACO Step 3 – Machiavellianism
Criterion A C E N O R2-Adj H–A HH ΔR2-Adj 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 ΔR2-Adj
DD Narcissism −.36 −.08 .50 .31 .00 .33 −.03 −.74 .21 −.06 −.06 −.22 .05 .03
DD Psychopathy −.70 −.13 −.11 −.05 .03 .59 −.06 −.10 .00 .13 .11 .00 .00 .01
SD3 Narcissism −.50 .04 .62 .02 .08 .53 .05 −.48 .09 .04 −.11 −.10 .06 .02
SD3 Psychopathy −.61 −.27 .24 .02 .06 .54 −.26 −.26 .05 .19 .19 .12 .03 .02
NARQ-S −.62 .01 .42 .20 −.07 .49 .02 −.53 .11 .08 .12 −.05 .05 .01
NPI-13 −.59 .08 .58 .14 .01 .53 .02 −.54 .11 .18 .04 −.14 .04 .04
PES −.51 .04 .37 .12 .00 .32 .10 −.51 .10 .06 .19 −.07 .07 .03
HSNS −.34 .09 .01 .62 −.03 .55 −.14 −.24 .03 −.01 .23 −.06 .12 .05
SWLS .04 .15 .32 −.24 −.15 .34 .05 .15 .01 .00 .01 −.15 −.17 .03
PID-5 Impulsivity −.15 −.56 .37 .13 .00 .43 −.12 −.06 .00 .17 .23 .05 −.03 .02
TriPM Boldness −.29 .03 .42 −.52 .15 .70 .05 −.15 .01 .22 −.13 −.08 .07 .06
TriPMMeanness −.76 −.18 .05 −.10 −.03 .66 −.11 −.11 .01 .18 .22 .17 −.09 .03
TriPM Disinhibition −.27 −.42 .20 .27 .04 .50 −.17 −.21 .03 .22 .19 .17 .01 .03
LPFS Total −.32 −.12 .05 .53 −.05 .60 .01 −.24 .02 .11 .32 .02 .05 .05
Note. A = Agreeableness, C = Conscientiousness, E = Extraversion, N = Neuroticism, O = Openness to Experience, H–A = HEXACO Agreeableness, HH = HEX-
ACO Honesty-Humility. The columns 4.1 to 4.4 are component scores from Bass-Ackwards analysis. Standardized beta coefficients (β) are reported. R2-Adj =
Adjusted R2 values. ΔR2-Adj = Change in adjusted R2 between current and previous step.
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Table 5.5
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses showing Incremental Effects of Honesty-Humility Facets Beyond IPIP-Agreeableness
Facets
Step 1 – Agreeableness Step 2 – Honesty-Humility
Criterion A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 R2-Adj HH1 HH2 HH3 HH4 ΔR2-Adj
DD Narcissism .02 −.36 .08 −.10 −.34 .03 .34 −.18 .05 −.46 −.21 .26
DD Psychopathy −.18 −.23 −.29 −.13 −.06 −.18 .59 −.08 −.11 .07 −.08 .01
SD3 Narcissism .00 −.17 .20 −.12 −.59 −.02 .47 .11 .03 −.31 −.38 .15
SD3 Psychopathy −.13 −.27 −.04 −.42 −.12 .00 .56 −.03 −.32 −.01 −.15 .07
NARQ-S −.10 −.28 .03 −.19 −.39 −.08 .50 −.12 −.02 −.28 −.17 .11
NPI-13 −.04 −.26 .14 −.14 −.53 −.05 .51 .01 .04 −.37 −.23 .14
PES −.10 −.21 .04 −.07 −.44 −.05 .35 .01 −.02 −.37 −.16 .12
HSNS −.27 −.24 −.09 −.13 .04 −.04 .30 −.30 .06 −.15 .01 .07
SWLS .30 .15 .25 .06 −.33 −.23 .27 .00 .09 .11 .18 .03
PID-5 Impulsivity −.04 −.26 −.12 −.28 .02 .17 .23 −.12 −.11 −.04 −.12 .02
TriPM Boldness .15 .05 .17 .06 −.56 −.05 .34 .24 −.15 −.04 −.21 .04
TriPMMeanness −.06 −.17 −.28 −.32 −.08 −.20 .68 .03 −.19 .01 −.12 .02
TriPM Disinhibition −.17 −.33 −.08 −.34 .11 .14 .40 −.18 −.30 −.04 −.05 .07
LPFS Total −.29 −.33 −.14 −.16 .13 .04 .41 −.27 .05 −.11 −.09 .07
Note. A1 = Trust, A2 = Morality, A3 = Altruism, A4 = Cooperation, A5 = Modesty, A6 = Sympathy, HH1 = Sincerity, HH2 =
Fairness, HH3 = Greed-Avoidance, HH4 = Modesty. Standardized beta coefficients (β) are reported. R2-Adj = Adjusted R2 values.
ΔR2-Adj = Change in adjusted R2 between current and previous step.
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The primary issue in the present thesis is whether Machiavellianism and psychopa-
thy are meaningfully distinct or the same phenomenon. At this point, a significant
number of studies have been conducted that have consistently shown thatMachiavel-
lianism and psychopathy are: (a) not factorially distinct; (b) the profile similarity for
measures of Machiavellianism more closely align with prototype psychopathy than
prototype Machiavellianism; (c) profiles of predicted outcomes are nearly identical
across the two constructs (i.e., both constructs have highly similar empirical profiles);
and (d) both constructs can be explained rather well by by the FFM and HEXACO
personality trait models. The studies presented herein have been conducted using di-
verse approaches, including studying particular inventories (Article I, II, and III), us-
ing item, facet, and domain level information (Articles I–IV), and using expert-rated
profiles from the extant literature (Article IV). There are numerous issues to discuss,
ranging from the remaining evidence supporting the independence ofMachiavellian-
ism from psychopathy, to what the future may hold for the DT – including how the
DT fits into the overarching literature on normal personality and PD – more broadly.
These questions will be dealt with in turn, beginning with the most relevant for this
thesis’ aim: should Machiavellianism be subsumed under psychopathy (and why not
the other way around?), and what are the consequences of such construct unification?
6.1 Reinterpret Machiavellianism as Psychopathy
Numerous studies have now shown that Machiavellianism and psychopathy are al-
most identical from a psychometric perspective (although not from a theoretical per-
spective), while narcissism is a little bit more independent. Because of such data,
Miller et al. (2017b) boldly suggested that Machiavellianism is better reinterpreted
as psychopathy and that measurement of Machiavellianism needs to be thoroughly
reconsidered (cf. Collison et al., 2018). I echo both of these sentiments. Before elab-
orating, it is worth noting that from a mathematical perspective, the present findings
are only sufficient to declare Machiavellianism and psychopathy linear transforma-
tions of each other. Accordingly, decisions about which construct to retain ultimately
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needs to be rooted in logical argument and cannot be settled exclusively with reference
to empirical research.
There are two good reasons for why Machiavellianism ought to be subsumed un-
der psychopathy, and not the other way around. First, Machiavellianism tends to
produce effects that are expected from psychopathy, but the opposite is not the case
(McHoskey et al., 1998). This is not to say that the extant literature on Machi-
avellianism is poorly conducted or meaningless. It simply means that the invento-
ries purportedly measuring Machiavellianism produce results that do not accord with
theoretical accounts of Machiavellianism, but do accord with theoretical accounts of
psychopathy. Hence, the most convenient way forward seems to be to reinterpret the
original studies as if they were conducted on psychopathy. A second reason is histor-
ical, namely that psychopathy is a broader and older construct with larger nomologi-
cal network.1 Ceteris paribus, retaining the older and greater theoretical foundation
seems logically stronger than doing the opposite.
6.2 Remaining Evidence for Construct Independence
I have presented four articles questioning the factorial structure of Machiavellianism
vis-à-vis psychopathy. It is important to qualify that there are definitely dissenting
voices, who make a strong – but in my view incomplete – case for the distinctness
of Machiavellianism and psychopathy. In addition to this, alternative conceptual-
izations have begun to emerge that attempt to expand the DT so that it includes
a broader range of constructs. One such endeavour is the Dark Tetrad (which in-
cludes the fourth domain sadism; Paulhus, 2014), andmore recently a bi-factor model
composed of nine constructs was proposed. The authors refer to the general factor
in this model as the ”Dark Factor” (henceforth ”D”; Moshagen, Hilbig, & Zettler,
2018). I divide my discussion of these positions into two, first dealing with the claim
that Machiavellianism and psychopathy are indeed distinguishable; and secondly dis-
cussing themost recent proposal, theD factor, which also includes sadism (Moshagen
et al., 2018).
6.2.1 Oversimplification or Necessary Reductionism?
Perhaps the strongest defense of Machiavellianism can be found in a book chapter
by Jones (2016). He argues that merging psychopathy and Machiavellianism is an
inappropriate oversimplification which leads to a loss of conceptual nuance between
1 As a psychological or psychiatric construct, psychopathy can be traced back to Pinel (1801), who de-
scribed psychopathy as a condition of mania without delusion (”manie sans délire”). For a historical
treatment of psychopathy, see Arrigo and Shipley (2001). The existing research literature on psy-
chopathy thus stretches far longer back in time and covers broader ground (i.e., is anchored in both
the clinical psychology and personality psychology literature) than the Machiavellianism literature.
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the constructs. Jones’ (2016) claim is fundamentally that Machiavellians are strategic
and long-term planners, while narcissists and psychopaths are not. Jones (2016, p. 90)
writes:
Unlike psychopathy, Machiavellianism has no association with short-
term thinking when properly assessed ( Jonason & Tost, 2010, Study 1).
Furthermore, although psychopathy and narcissism have unique links
with impulsivity, Machiavellianism does not ( Jones & Paulhus, 2011b).
It should be noted that both Machiavellianism and psychopathy predict
stealing ( Jones, 2013), sexual infidelity (McHoskey, 2001), and academic
dishonesty (Williams, Nathanson, & Paulhus, 2010). However, unlike
psychopathic individuals (e.g., Hare, 1996), Machiavellian individuals
use caution when stealing (e.g., Cooper & Peterson, 1980; Jones, 2014),
maintain relationships in the face of infidelity ( Jones & Weiser, 2014),
and do not engage in impulsive forms of academic dishonesty (Williams
et al., 2010).
Jones (2016) go on by positing that self-reported behavior of hypothetical sit-
uations is not enough to properly distinguish between the constructs, but instead,
behavioral outcomes ought to be pursued. While I agree in principle (self-reported
behavior certainly has limitations), behavioral outcomes are almost always dependent
on self-report questionnaires to some extent. The same is true for the neuroscientific
evidence2 that Jones cite and the more recent experimental DT research (e.g., Curtis
et al., 2018; Jones & Paulhus, 2017) which is sometimes believed to resolve construct
validity issues. The main problem with these studies is that they use DT inventories
to classify whether a behavioral outcome was associated with the DT trait in ques-
tion. In other words, the results are contingent on, or bounded by, the inventories
assessing the traits (i.e., on self-reports). The issue is, if the results presented herein
are to be relied upon, that the inventories do not produce two different dimensions
(i.e., Machiavellianism and psychopathy), which makes the entire argument circular.
Jones (2016, p. 90) produces a list of testable claims, an effort that is certainly
commendable. He writes that
Machiavellianism is likely unrelated to a series of variables with known
connections to psychopathy, narcissism, and dispositional sadism, specif-
ically: (a) recklessness or impulsivity (e.g., petty theft, street crimes,
2 In addition to the self-report nature such studies are predicated on, there are well-known statistical
problems with personality neuroscience studies (Vul, Harris, Winkielman, & Pashler, 2009). For
instance, Yarkoni (2009) showed that much larger sample sizes (preferably in excess of 200 partic-
ipants) are required in personality neuroscience, because of the correlational nature of the studies.
Such requirements were rarely, if ever, met in the early personality neuroscience literature. To the
best of my knowledge, there are no high powered neuroscience studies on Machiavellianism.
76 Chapter 6. Discussion
drug-related crimes); (b) reactivity/emotionality (e.g., domestic violence,
physical abuse); (c) social pressure (e.g., drug use, vandalism); (d) ego
threat (e.g., responses to insults, anger); (e) sadistic desires (e.g., Internet
trolling); (f ) deficits in impulse control (e.g., sexual coaxing or coercion);
or (g) low socioeconomic status, poverty, or desperation (e.g., robbery).
My overarching criticism of these ideas is that we lack a framework for how to
interpret the data if we were to conduct studies in these areas (although some have
certainly been carried out, already). Take (a) recklessness or impulsivity as an ex-
ample, which was the only one (out of 15 outcomes) where Machiavellianism and
psychopathy significantly differed in meta-analytic findings (Vize et al., 2018b), al-
though this difference was small (weighted effect sizes were .35 for psychopathy and
.23 for Machiavellianism).
If a new study on this topic was to be conducted using self-reports for Machiavel-
lianism and psychopathy, together with either self-reported or more objective mea-
sures of recklessness and impulsivity, my hypothesis is that Machiavellianism would
be positively related to impulsivity, but not as much as psychopathy. To digress briefly,
I think this is because Machiavellianism presents as ”a less severe form of psychopa-
thy” (Vize et al., 2018b, p. 108), which in turn is caused by differences in item phras-
ing in the inventories, which in turn produces different item endorsement rates (cf.
Persson et al., 2017). Assuming that such results were obtained, what should we
make of them? The conclusions we can draw from one moderate and one large cor-
relation are highly limited, and that is a limitation intrinsic to contemporary social
science. One of the points of criticism raised by Miller et al. (2019) is the lack of
dependent correlations (i.e., formal statistical testing) in the DT literature. While
they may have a point, running such an analysis and finding that Machiavellianism
and psychopathy are differently related to impulsivity generates limited new infor-
mation. Finding a significantly different effect would also be a function of sample
size, since the null hypothesis is ”quasi-always false” (Meehl, 1967; Meehl, 1978).
Thus, the practical significance of the effect, or whether it is substantive in some way
would have to be adjudicated in some other fashion than using mere null-hypothesis
significance testing.
Jones (2016) worry that the literature may become oversimplified bymerging con-
structs. I am more worried that we have to oversimplify, because there is too much
noise in our data to make precise claims (Meehl, 1978; Morey & Lakens, 2016). In
my opinion, we know too little about the response process and the various sources
of measurement error to draw particularly strong conclusions about correlations that
differ by small magnitudes. The recent advances in terms of preregistering hypoth-
esis and eliminating questionable research practices are certainly beneficial (Munafò
et al., 2017; Nosek et al., 2015), but they do not resolve the noisiness of our data.
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6.2.2 Proposed Expansion of the Dark Triad
A recent article detailed the extension of the DT by adding six constructs (i.e., ego-
ism, moral disengagement, entitlement, sadism, self-interest, and spitefulness), in
order to arrive at a broader and perhaps more cogent view of antisocial traits (Mosha-
gen et al., 2018). The researchers’ approach is highly similar to that conducted herein,
insofar as a bifactor model was applied to all nine constructs in order to extract gen-
eral and specific sources of variance. This piece of research was rigorously conducted
and well-thought through, but the results nevertheless demonstrate a correlation be-
tween the D factor and agreeableness of -.69, and -.80 for HH. The FFM model
explained 54% variance in D and HEXACO explained 70%. The authors neverthe-
less concluded that D is more than just HH by showing incremental validity of D
over and above HH against a set of well-chosen criteria. For instance, the D factor
added 11% variance beyond HH in explaining self-centeredness. While this inter-
pretation is strictly speaking correct, as self-centeredness cannot only be explained by
HH, it is doubtful that the D factor would add very much variance beyond the entire
HEXACO or FFM models (as opposed to just the HH domain).
Another issue is that the D factor adds more than 5% variance beyond HH for
just five of nine criteria. Although the authors do not report zero-order correlations
between FFM or HEXACO and their criterion set, they do report zero-order cor-
relations between self-centeredness and the original nine constructs comprising D.
These correlations are all between .30 and .62. For instance, the correlation between
self-centeredness and SD3 psychopathy is .62. We know based on Table 5.4 reported
previously that SD3 psychopathy is not only explained by agreeableness or HH, but
also relates to low conscientiousness and high extraversion. Similar cases can be made
for all reported criteria. Thus, it seems doubtful that the six added constructs will add
substantial information beyond the FFM or HEXACO.
Two questions need consideration that cannot be satisfactorily answered here: (a)
how much added variance (beyond a normal personality model) should be considered
good enough in order to justify the use of additional constructs, or even additional
items? and (b) is it preferable (and if so, why?) to use e.g. nine dark constructs instead
of HH? Regarding the former question, numerous scientific and practical concerns
need balancing, such as howmuch data can be collected, the goal of the study, whether
reliable measurements can be made and so forth (see Smith, Fischer, & Fister, 2003).
Regarding (b), I think the principle of parsimony likely favors a normal personality
model over a collection of diverse constructs. With that said, the issue is not necessar-
ily that easily resolved, as there is little to no agreement in the personality psychology
literature with regards to why (theoretically, not psychometrically) e.g. agreeableness
facets positively covary. The same is true for dark constructs. Why should the for-
mer be privileged? In my opinion, I think the FFM should be privileged because it
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was built from the very foundations of language (i.e., the lexical hypothesis). I find
this hypothesis sufficiently convincing to conclude that the FFM covers a great deal
of conceptual ground which should be taken advantage of. The rest of the discussion
will elaborate on how the DT literature rests inside the FFM framework, and what
implications this may have for future revisions to psychiatric nosologies, such as the
DSM .
6.3 The Five FactorModel as aMeta-Structure
In Chapter 2, a number of examples were provided showing how the FFM relates
to psychopathology in general, and PDs, more specifically. Indeed, the FFM has
been proven to provide a solid meta-structure for organizing personality. Normal
personality trait inventories such as the IPIP-NEO can be used to produce so-called
PD trait counts, meaning thatDSM-IV PD types can be captured using specific FFM
facets (Miller, 2012; Miller, Few, Lynam, & MacKillop, 2015). Such scores could,
in turn, be used clinically, although there are certainly limitations to such use (e.g.,
Ben-Porath & Waller, 1992; Costa & McCrae, 1992c).
Because of these developments and the fact that the FFM also provides good ex-
planatory power over the entire DT model, I suggest moving from the DT towards a
broader FFM framework. There was only partial movement in the DSM-5 revision
process, but the other major nosology, the 11th edition of the International Classi-
fication of Diseases and Related Health Problem (ICD), currently under production by
the World Health Organization, have finally settled on a dimensional classification
system of PDs (Tyrer, Mulder, Kim, & Crawford, 2019). While the system is not
identical with the FFM, the five proposed domains are nevertheless highly similar
(see Tyrer et al., 2019).
An alternative to both DSM and ICD is the Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psy-
chopathology (HiTOP; Kotov et al., 2017), which is a data-driven framework spec-
ifying dimensional phenomena across levels of abstraction. The HiToP framework
is deeply rooted in personality, insofar as it currently specifies six broad spectra: so-
matoform, internalizing, thought disorder, externalizing disinhibited, externalizing
antagonistic, and detachment, which are all interrelated with FFM personality traits
(Conway et al., 2019a; Kotov et al., 2017; Widiger et al., 2018a). Thus, the FFM is
getting more and more integrated in models specifying general psychopathology. In
testing different models, Conway, Mansolf, and Reise (2019b) showed that HiToP
model offers ecological validity and can be practically useful in clinical assessment,
while categorical diagnoses showed more limited utility. While a lot more work re-
mains to be done, it looks like the future holds a dimensional system of psychopathol-
ogy in which personality traits play a large role. Studies on the DT can serve a small
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role in that process by providing better understanding of, mainly, the domains agree-
ableness, extraversion, and conscientiousness. But such understanding begins by solid
measurement practices (Clark & Watson, 2019; Flake & Fried, in press).
6.4 Limitations
Like all studies, the present work has a number of limitations. The conducted studies
exclusively rely on self-report information, which introduces potential method ef-
fects and does not allow for the benefits of multi-method measurement (Campbell
& Fiske, 1959). This also entails the problem of self-knowledge and accuracy of re-
sponses, as there are important concerns about how honestly participants report their
levels of dishonesty. Meta-analytic results suggest that distorted responding is not
a major issue in psychopathy research (Ray et al., 2013; for similar findings about
narcissism, see Sleep, Sellbom, Campbell, & Miller, 2017a), as long as there are no
incentives to distort responses (e.g., parole; Kelsey, Rogers, & Robinson, 2014). Be-
cause the present research is mostly concerned with the factorial or structural validity
of the DT inventories, response patterns are noteworthy but not a central limitation.
Much of the data has been collected from participants about whom little to nothing
is known, although quality checks have been conducted by others.3 The benefits of
these methods is that large amounts of data can be collected quickly which enables
relatively stable parameter estimates, but with the drawback that little is known about
sample specific characteristics.
With the increasing popularity of bifactor models, increasing concerns with re-
spect to their validity has also grown. One known issue is that bifactor models are
highly flexible, which entails that they can exhibit good model fit even in the pres-
ence of nonsense responses (Bonifay et al., 2017). This may be a good reason to begin
construct validation by fitting a bifactor model, subsequently adding constraints in
order to arrive at a model less likely to fit noise. This relates to a broader shortcoming
amongst researchers (myself included) in that alternative models are rarely specified
or tested. Typically, researchers have a model in mind and they test only that model,
but the strong Popperian principle of introducing potential falsifiers is thus neglected
(Crede & Harms, 2019; Tomarken & Waller, 2003; Watts, Poore, & Waldman,
2019). Illustrating that a particular model does not fit a given data structure can be
very important in the process of eliminating alternative hypotheses.
3 The quality of MTurk data has been studied rigorously (Thomas & Clifford, 2017) and the larger
publicly available data set used in Article II has been subjected to some rudimentary quality checks:
https://openpsychometrics.org/_rawdata/validity/.
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6.5 Conclusion
A number of conclusions can be drawn based on the present work. Starting with
narrow conclusions based on the present studies: Machiavellianism should be recon-
ceptualized as psychopathy. First, because the two dimensions are nearly identical,
and second because findings fromMachiavellianism correspond more closely to what
one would expect from psychopathy. From a slightly broader perspective, there is also
good evidence that the DT should be integrated more deeply into the FFM or HEX-
ACO or perhaps be subsumed by it. The DT may unfortunately add more confusion
than clarity, as each DT domain can be explained by basic trait models. Indeed, in
their relatively recent meta-analysis, Muris et al. (2017, p. 196) commented that:
These results suggest that the dark triad concept largely is redundant and
has little to add to traditional personality models, although it is clear that
more research is needed on forensic populations, experimental situations,
and behavioral outcomes for investigators to draw a more definitive con-
clusion.
Thus, there are certainly issues that have not been resolved, but numerous voices
within the DT field now seem to have converged around the idea that the DT may
produce more problems than it resolves.
Taking a broader perspective, the evidence is clear that both adaptive and mal-
adaptive traits are aspects of the same underlying dimensions (Widiger et al., 2018b),
PD categories can be estimated using dimensional trait indicators (Strickland et al.,
2018), and we are gaining a better understanding of what it means to have more or
less the opposite of PD, namely a healthy personality (Bleidorn et al., 2019). There is
a lot of work left to be done before personality psychologists can make precise predic-
tions, especially at the individual level (cf. Yarkoni &Westfall, 2017), but descriptions
of personality are powerful tools that have come and long way.
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